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Recent studies have established that the decisions of a federal court of ap-
peals judge are influenced not only by the preferences of the judge, but also by 
the preferences of her panel colleagues.  Although the existence of these “panel 
effects” is well documented, the reasons that they occur are less well understood.  
Scholars have proposed a number of competing theories to explain panel effects, 
but none has been established empirically.  In this Article, I report an empirical 
test of two competing explanations of panel effects—one emphasizing delibera-
tion internal to a circuit panel, the other hypothesizing strategic behavior on the 
part of circuit judges.  The latter explanation posits that court of appeals 
judges act strategically in light of the expected actions of others and that, there-
fore, panel effects should depend upon how the preferences of the Supreme Court 
or the circuit en banc are aligned relative to those of the panel members.  Ana-
lyzing votes in Title VII sex discrimination cases, I find no support for the the-
ory that panel effects are caused by strategic behavior aimed at inducing or 
avoiding Supreme Court review.  On the other hand, the findings strongly sug-
gest that panel effects are influenced by circuit preferences.  Both minority and 
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majority judges on ideologically mixed panels differ in their voting behavior de-
pending upon how the preferences of the circuit as a whole are aligned relative 
to the panel members.  This study provides evidence that panel effects do not 
result from a dynamic wholly internal to the three judges hearing a case, but 
are influenced by the environment in the circuit as a whole as well. 
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INTRODUCTION
One of the central institutional features of the United States 
courts of appeals is the use of judicial panels to decide cases.  Rather 
than having a single appellate judge decide each appeal, or even hav-
ing a group of appellate judges deciding in isolation and tallying their 
votes, the appeals process is specifically structured to promote a col-
laborative form of decision making.1  Three appellate judges are as-
signed to decide a case together, and they typically share their back-
ground research, sit together as a panel to hear oral arguments, meet 
to discuss their views, and issue a single opinion resolving the appeal.2
Of course, not all cases are typical, and judges sometimes dissent or 
1 For a detailed description of the organizational structure of the federal appellate 
courts, see JONATHAN MATTHEW COHEN, INSIDE APPELLATE COURTS: THE IMPACT OF 
COURT ORGANIZATION ON JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS 
OF APPEALS ch. 2 (2002). 
2 See id. ch. 5 (discussing the interaction among the judges within a court of ap-
peals).
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concur separately.  These occurrences are relatively infrequent, how-
ever, and cases involving separate opinions are viewed as deviations 
from the usual model of appellate decision making.  Thus, as D.C. 
Circuit Judge Harry Edwards put it, “judging on the appellate bench is 
a group process.”3
As a matter of institutional design, why are federal appellate 
courts structured in this way?  Certainly it is not for the sake of effi-
ciency, as the same number of judges sitting alone could decide ap-
peals more quickly than when sitting with two of their colleagues.  
Most explanations focus on the quality of decision making.4  Korn-
hauser and Sager, for example, assert that increasing the number of 
judges making a decision will increase the probability that a court will 
reach a correct decision.5  So long as each judge is more likely than 
not to decide correctly, a correct outcome is more likely whenever a 
group of judges decides by majority vote.6  Others have suggested that 
this error-reducing effect results from the exchange of ideas and in-
formation that occurs during the process of deliberation.7  For exam-
ple, Judge Edwards describes the interactions among judges on an ap-
pellate panel as “a process of dialogue, persuasion, and revision”8 that 
enables them to “find common ground and reach better decisions.”9
From an empirical perspective, it is difficult to test these claims in 
the absence of consensus regarding what makes one decision “better” 
than another.  However, scholars have collected considerable evidence 
suggesting that decision making by a federal court of appeals judge 
sitting on a three-judge panel differs from what one might expect 
3 Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. PA.
L. REV. 1639, 1656 (2003). 
4 See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember 
Courts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2297, 2362 (1999) (noting the argument that the purpose of a 
multimember appellate court is to increase accuracy); Edwards, supra note 3, at 1640-
41 (arguing that collegiality on appellate panels enables judges to “reach better deci-
sions”); Douglas H. Ginsburg & Donald Falk, The Court En Banc:  1981–1990, 59 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1008, 1035-36 (1991) (suggesting that decisions involving more judges 
are more likely to be correct); cf. Michael E. Solimine, Ideology and En Banc Review, 67 
N.C. L. REV. 29, 40 (1988) (reporting that en banc review is justified by the belief that 
the involvement “of more judges leads to sounder decisions”). 
5 Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82, 
98 (1986). 
6 Id. at 97-99. 
7 See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 4, at 2372 (suggesting that collegial deliberation 
will enhance the accuracy of decision making). 
8 Edwards, supra note 3, at 1661. 
9 Id. at 1641. 
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from that judge sitting alone.  In light of the considerable evidence 
that judges’ votes correlate with their political affiliation,10 one might 
suppose that federal appellate judges have basic policy preferences 
that they express through their votes,11 and that panel decision mak-
ing simply reflects the aggregation of those preferences through a ma-
jority-vote rule.  Thus, one might expect that the likelihood that a par-
ticular judge would vote for a particular outcome (for example, 
upholding an affirmative action plan) would be stable, regardless of 
whether she sat with one, two, or no other like-minded judges.  In 
fact, federal appeals court judges do not vote the same way regardless 
of panel composition, but instead appear to be influenced by the 
preferences of the other judges with whom they sit when deciding a 
case.  This phenomenon—commonly referred to as “panel effects”—
has been documented in a wide variety of legal contexts.12
10 See, e.g., C.K. ROWLAND & ROBERT A. CARP, POLITICS AND JUDGMENT IN FEDERAL 
DISTRICT COURTS ch. 2 (1996) (finding that political-party affiliation and the party of 
the appointing President appear to influence the voting behavior of federal district 
court judges); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DAVID SCHKADE, LISA M. ELLMAN & ANDRES SAWICKI,
ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2006) 
[hereinafter SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?]; Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. 
Tiller, Essay, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine:  Whistleblowing on the 
Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2169 (1998) (documenting a correlation 
between party affiliation and case outcomes in D.C. Circuit cases reviewing agency de-
cisions); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 
VA. L. REV. 1717, 1719 (1997) (concluding that political ideology “significantly influ-
ences judicial decisionmaking on the D.C. Circuit”); Donald R. Songer & Susan Haire, 
Integrating Alternative Approaches to the Study of Judicial Voting:  Obscenity Cases in the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 963, 977 (1992) (finding that political ideology 
correlates with judges’ voting in obscenity cases); Donald R. Songer & Reginald S. 
Sheehan, Supreme Court Impact on Compliance and Outcomes:  Miranda and New York 
Times in the United States Courts of Appeals, 43 W. POL. Q. 297, 315 (1990) (noting that 
political party is “significantly related to judicial voting decisions” in the United States 
courts of appeals); Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade & Lisa Michelle Ellman, Essay, Ideo-
logical Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals:  A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301, 352 
(2004) [hereinafter Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting] (finding “evidence of a relationship 
between the political party of the appointing president and judicial voting patterns”). 
11 The fact that judges’ votes correlate with party affiliation does not mean that 
they are not following legal doctrine.  Legal rules are inevitably “open textured,” allow-
ing for the exercise of judgment.  In those areas where legal discretion exists, judges 
may pursue policy goals without necessarily violating legal norms.  See Pauline T. Kim, 
Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 410 (2007) (“The judge who exercises dis-
cretion is doing so pursuant to and consistent with the various legal norms that govern 
the work of judging.”). 
12 See FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 176-77 
(2007) (concluding that “panel effects are enormously important in determining the 
judge’s vote and the case outcome”); SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?, supra
note 10, at 12 (documenting panel effects in a wide range of issue areas); Adam B. Cox 
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In one of the earliest studies, Richard Revesz examined the votes 
of D.C. Circuit judges in environmental cases and concluded that 
“while individual ideology and panel composition both have impor-
tant effects on a judge’s vote, the ideology of one’s colleagues is a bet-
ter predictor of one’s vote than one’s own ideology.”13  Similarly, 
Frank Cross and Emerson Tiller analyzed D.C. Circuit cases involving 
the application of the Chevron doctrine to agency actions, and con-
cluded that judges’ votes were influenced not only by their political 
affiliation, but also by the composition of the panel on which they 
sat.14  More recently, Cass Sunstein, David Schkade, Lisa Ellman, and 
Andres Sawicki investigated voting patterns on federal appellate pan-
els across circuits and in a variety of legal areas.15  In most of the issue 
& Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 53 (2008) (con-
cluding that the ideology of other judges sitting on the panel affects judges’ votes in 
Voting Rights Act cases); Cross & Tiller, supra note 10, at 2175-76 (concluding that the 
presence of ideological minorities on judicial panels influences the votes of majority 
judges); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy?  An Em-
pirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 870-71 (2006) (finding that like-
minded judges are more likely to uphold lower court decisions with which they agree 
when sitting on panels together); Revesz, supra note 10, at 1771-72 (concluding that 
the ideology of the other panel members influences a judge’s vote in environmental 
cases); Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting, supra note 10, at 352-53 (documenting panel 
effects in a wide range of issue areas). 
 Studies exploring the influence of female and racial-minority judges on appellate 
decision making have similarly found evidence of panel effects.  See Sean Farhang & 
Gregory Wawro, Institutional Dynamics on the U.S. Court of Appeals:  Minority Representation 
Under Panel Decision Making, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 299, 320 (2004) (finding that the 
presence of a woman on a panel causes the men on that panel to vote more “liber-
ally”); Jennifer L. Peresie, Note, Female Judges Matter:  Gender and Collegial Decisonmaking 
in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759, 1786-87 (2005) (finding that the pres-
ence of female judges on a panel increases the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail 
in sex discrimination and harassment cases); Christina L. Boyd, Lee Epstein & Andrew 
D. Martin, Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging 20 (2009) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author) (finding that the presence of a woman on a panel in-
creases the chance that a male judge will vote in favor of the plaintiff in sex discrimina-
tion cases); Charles M. Cameron & Craig P. Cummings, Diversity and Judicial Decision-
Making:  Evidence from Affirmative Action Cases in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 
1971–1999, at 25 (Mar. 30, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (find-
ing that the presence of a nonwhite judge on a panel increases the likelihood that the 
panel will vote in favor of affirmative action). 
13 Revesz, supra note 10, at 1764. 
14 Cross & Tiller, supra note 10, at 2171. 
15 Sunstein et al.’s initial study focused on cases involving abortion rights, affirma-
tive action, campaign finance, capital punishment, Commerce Clause challenges to 
congressional enactments, the Contracts Clause, criminal appeals, disability discrimi-
nation, industry challenges to environmental regulation, piercing the corporate veil, 
race discrimination, sex discrimination, sexual harassment, and claimed takings of pri-
vate property without just compensation.  Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting, supra note 
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areas that they examined, they found evidence that a judge’s votes are 
correlated not only with her own political affiliation, but with the po-
litical affiliations of her copanelists as well.16  In some instances, the 
influence of panel colleagues even appears to swamp individual pref-
erences.  Thus, for example, a Republican appointee sitting with two 
Democratic appointees is more likely to vote to uphold affirmative action 
programs than a Democratic appointee sitting with two Republican ap-
pointees.17  Clearly, then, the fact that federal appellate judges hear 
cases in panels of three makes a difference in their decision making. 
Although the existence of panel effects is well documented, the 
reasons that they occur are not clearly understood.  Scholars have 
proposed a number of explanations, but none of these theories has 
been conclusively established.18  This Article empirically explores when
panel effects occur in an effort to better understand why they occur.  
More specifically, it offers an empirical test of two competing types of 
explanations:  deliberative and strategic. 
10, at 304.  In their follow-up study, the analysis was expanded to include cases involv-
ing commercial speech, congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity, the 
Federal Communications Commission, gay and lesbian rights, the National Labor Re-
lations Board, the National Environmental Policy Act, obscenity, standing, school and 
racial segregation, and punitive damages.  SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?,
supra note 10, at 8. 
16 In nearly all of these issue areas, Sunstein et al. found evidence of both ideo-
logical voting and panel effects.  The exceptions to this general pattern were cases in-
volving criminal appeals, takings of private property, punitive damage awards, standing 
to sue, and Commerce Clause challenges.  In these areas, they found no difference in 
the voting patterns of judges based on party affiliation.  SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES 
POLITICAL?, supra note 10, at 48.  In cases involving abortion restrictions and capital 
punishment, however, they found that although judges vote ideologically, their votes 
do not appear to be influenced by their colleagues.  Cases involving gay and lesbian 
rights seemed to exhibit a similar pattern of ideological voting, but no influence from 
panel composition; these cases, however, are too few in number to draw any firm con-
clusions about whether panel effects are present or not.  Id.
17 Republican appointees vote to uphold affirmative action programs 37% of the 
time when sitting on all-Republican-appointee panels, 49% of the time when sitting 
with one Republican appointee and one Democratic appointee, and 65% of the time 
when sitting with two Democratic appointees.  Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting, supra
note 10, at 319.  For Democratic appointees, the reverse pattern holds:  82% vote in 
favor of upholding affirmative action programs on an all-Democrat-appointee panel, 
80% when sitting with one Democratic appointee and one Republican appointee, and 
61% when sitting with two Republican appointees.  Id.
18 See, e.g., CROSS, supra note 12, at 152 (explaining that the results of the earlier 
studies could not explain why panel effects occur); Revesz, supra note 10, at 1755-56 
(stating that his analysis cannot conclusively disentangle competing hypotheses); Sun-
stein et al., Ideological Voting, supra note 10, at 307 (explaining that the data are consis-
tent with several different hypotheses for the causes of panel effects). 
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By deliberative explanations, I mean to identify those theories that 
emphasize the internal exchanges that occur among panel members 
and the potential for these exchanges to influence a judge’s vote.  For 
purposes of the empirical test undertaken here, the exact mechanism 
by which judges influence one another is not critical.  It may be the 
case that they come to persuade one another through the exchange of 
information and the power of reasoned argument.19  Alternatively, 
psychological mechanisms—such as conformity pressures or group po-
larization—may be operative, leading judges to change their minds 
when confronted with the opinions of their colleagues.20  The critical 
point, for purposes of this study, is that pure deliberative accounts at-
tribute panel effects to the dynamics internal to the members of a 
panel, rather than to any interaction with other actors in the judicial 
system.
By contrast, strategic theories explain observed panel effects as the 
result of strategic behavior by appellate judges.21  These theories posit 
that when deciding cases, individual judges advance their goals not 
simply by exercising their discretion in a manner consistent with their 
policy preferences, but by taking into account the likely responses of 
other actors as well.22  Rather than naïvely voting their preferences, 
19 See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 3, at 1600 (arguing that a judge’s initial views may 
shift through the process of collegial deliberation); Farhang & Wawro, supra note 12, 
at 308 and sources cited therein (describing the deliberative model of panel decision 
making).
20 See, e.g., SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?, supra note 10, at 63-78. 
21 See, e.g., VIRGINIA A. HETTINGER, STEFANIE A. LINDQUIST & WENDY L. MARTINEK,
JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT 61 (2006) [hereinafter HETTINGER ET AL., COLLEGIAL 
COURT]; Cross & Tiller, supra note 10, at 2159. 
22 In recent years, strategic theories of judicial behavior have become prominent 
in the political science and legal literatures.  See generally CROSS, supra note 12, at 94-
122 (testing various strategic theories of court of appeals decision making); Gregory A. 
Caldeira, John R. Wright & Christopher J.W. Zorn, Sophisticated Voting and Gate-Keeping 
in the Supreme Court, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 549 (1999) (testing empirically whether Su-
preme Court Justices engage in strategic voting in certiorari decisions); William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 
(1991) (describing strategic interactions between the Supreme Court, Congress, and 
the President in which each tries to impose its policy preferences in light of the ex-
pected responses of other players); Forrest Maltzman & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Strategic Pol-
icy Considerations and Voting Fluidity on the Burger Court, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 581 (1996) 
(testing empirically whether Supreme Court Justices act strategically in changing their 
votes between the initial conference and final vote); Matthew McCubbins, Roger Noll 
& Barry Weingast (McNollgast), Politics and the Courts:  A Positive Theory of Judicial Doc-
trine and the Rule of Law, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1631 (1995) (modeling judicial decision 
making as a product of strategic interactions between upper and lower courts); Donald 
R. Songer, Jeffrey A. Segal & Charles M. Cameron, The Hierarchy of Justice:  Testing a 
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court of appeals judges are hypothesized to act with an eye to the ex-
pected behavior of the Supreme Court, the circuit sitting en banc, and 
their panel colleagues.23  An appellate judge will decide whether to 
vote her sincere preference or to accommodate the views of her col-
leagues based on her beliefs about the likelihood of further review 
and the probable outcome if the case is reviewed.  Unlike purely de-
liberative explanations, strategic theories suggest that panel effects will 
depend upon the preferences of the Supreme Court and/or the cir-
cuit as a whole, and not just upon the preferences of the three judges 
comprising an appellate panel. 
Strategic theories play an important role in some accounts of the 
federal judicial hierarchy.  Many scholars have suggested that the risk 
of reversal assures that lower court judges follow the doctrines set out 
in Supreme Court precedent, even those with which they disagree.24
However, given the tens of thousands of cases decided by the courts of 
appeals each year, the Supreme Court’s limited reversal power can 
only be effective if it has some mechanism for identifying appropriate 
cases for review.  One hypothesis is that court of appeals judges dis-
sent in order to signal to the Supreme Court that certain cases deviate 
from established doctrine and should be reviewed.25  Other scholars 
have described the relationship between a circuit court and a three-
judge panel in a similar manner.26  Just as the Supreme Court moni-
Principal-Agent Model of Supreme Court–Circuit Court Interactions, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 673 
(1994) (modeling the interaction between the Supreme Court and lower federal 
courts as a principal-agent relationship); Paul J. Wahlbeck, James F. Spriggs, II & 
Forrest Maltzman, Marshalling the Court:  Bargaining and Accommodation on the United 
States Supreme Court, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 294 (1998) (testing empirically whether Supreme 
Court opinions are written strategically based on an examination of draft opinions).
23 Cross & Tiller, supra note 10, at 2156; see also HETTINGER ET AL., COLLEGIAL 
COURT, supra note 21, at 40-41. 
24 See, e.g., Charles M. Cameron, Jeffrey A. Segal & Donald Songer, Strategic Audit-
ing in a Political Hierarchy:  An Informational Model of the Supreme Court’s Certiorari Deci-
sions, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 101, 102 (2000) (arguing that lower court judges care 
about reversal because they care about the disposition of cases and their professional 
reputations); Tracey E. George & Albert H. Yoon, The Federal Court System:  A Principal-
Agent Perspective, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 819, 822 (2003) (describing reversal as the Su-
preme Court’s “obvious mechanism of control over lower court judges”); Songer, Segal 
& Cameron, supra note 22, at 680 (theorizing that lower court judges will “shirk” less 
when the likelihood of reversal is high). 
25 See Cross & Tiller, supra note 10, at 2173; see also HETTINGER ET AL., COLLEGIAL 
COURT supra note 21, at 76-77. 
26 See, e.g., Tracey E. George, The Dynamics and Determinants of the Decision To Grant 
En Banc Review, 74 WASH. L. REV. 213, 245 (1999) (noting “an implicit but incomplete 
agency agreement” between the circuit court and panel). 
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tors and occasionally reverses the decisions of the lower federal courts, 
a circuit sitting en banc can review and revise a panel decision that is 
inconsistent with circuit precedent or norms.  This form of monitor-
ing is costly, however, and so scholars have suggested that the circuit 
will rely on signals, such as the presence of a dissenting opinion, to 
identify which panel decisions warrant closer scrutiny.27
In order to test these two competing explanations for panel ef-
fects, I begin with the observation that strategic accounts—unlike 
purely deliberative ones—predict that appellate voting behavior will 
be influenced by interactions with a reviewing court.  More specifi-
cally, if appellate judges act strategically—with an eye to the likely re-
sponse of the Supreme Court or the circuit en banc—then observed 
panel effects should differ depending upon how the preferences of 
the appellate judges on the panel are aligned relative to those of the 
Supreme Court or the circuit as a whole.  By contrast, if purely delib-
erative explanations are true, the preferences of the Supreme Court 
or the circuit as a whole should have no systematic impact on whether 
or when panel effects are observed. 
In the empirical test described here, I analyze data about judges’ 
votes in Title VII sex discrimination cases decided by the U.S. courts 
of appeals.28  Sex discrimination cases are often perceived to be ideo-
logically contested, and scholars have documented the existence of 
both ideological voting and panel effects in these types of cases.29
Most prior studies of panel effects have used the party of the appoint-
ing President as a proxy for judicial ideology30 and then have com-
pared the voting records of Republican-appointed and Democrat-
appointed judges across different panel compositions.  In this study, I 
follow the convention of using the party of the appointing President 
to define ideological alignments—for example, I assume that a Re-
27 See HETTINGER ET AL., COLLEGIAL COURT, supra note 21, at 76-77; George, supra
note 26, at 247. 
28 See Section II.C., infra, for a more detailed description of the data. 
29 See, e.g., SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?, supra note 10, at 30-31 (find-
ing evidence of both ideological voting and panel effects in sex discrimination cases); 
Peresie, supra note 12, at 1768-69 (finding that both judge gender and judicial ideology 
significantly affect outcomes in Title VII sex discrimination and harassment cases); 
Boyd, Epstein & Martin, supra note 12, at 20 (documenting large panel effects in sex 
discrimination cases). 
30 E.g., SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?, supra note 10; Cox & Miles, supra
note 12, at 3; Cross & Tiller, supra note 10, at 2168; Miles & Sunstein, supra note 12, at 
830; Revesz, supra note 10, at 1718-19; Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting, supra note 10, at 
302 n.1. 
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publican-appointed judge sitting with two Democrat-appointed judges 
is in the “ideological minority,” while the two Democratic appointees 
are the “majority” judges on that panel. 
Unlike prior studies, however, mine does not rely on the “percent 
liberal” vote to measure judges’ voting behavior.  Instead, I examine 
the extent to which judges vote counter-ideologically—that is, in a di-
rection opposite to what a naïve ideological model would predict.  
This methodological innovation permits a focus on the central phe-
nomenon of interest:  the changing likelihood that a judge will vote 
counter to a naïve ideological prediction depending upon the panel 
composition.  In the empirical test, I examine whether observed panel 
effects—the changes in the likelihood of a counter-ideological vote 
under different voting conditions—are contingent upon the prefer-
ences of the Supreme Court or the circuit en banc. 
Using this method, I find no evidence that panel effects are influ-
enced by the relative preferences of the Supreme Court.  More spe-
cifically, I observe no difference between the voting patterns of either 
minority or majority judges on mixed panels regardless of whether the 
minority judge is more closely aligned with the Supreme Court or with 
the panel majority.  This finding casts doubt on one explanation of 
hierarchical control—namely, the theory that appellate judges’ voting 
behavior is motivated by the desire to signal noncompliant decisions 
to the Supreme Court.  On the other hand, I find evidence that the 
tendency of appeals court judges to be influenced by their panel col-
leagues does depend on how the preferences of the circuit court as a 
whole are aligned relative to those of the panel members.  When a 
minority judge on a panel is ideologically closer to the circuit as a 
whole than to the panel majority, the majority judges are less likely to 
vote in a stereotypically ideological direction, while the minority judge 
is more likely to do so.  This result is consistent with a strategic expla-
nation for panel effects, although the exact mechanism by which cir-
cuit preferences influence panel behavior remains uncertain.  What 
the results do indicate is that panel effects are not the result of a dy-
namic wholly internal to the three-judge panel, but are influenced by 
the circuit environment. 
This Article proceeds as follows:  Part I surveys the competing 
theoretical explanations that have been offered to explain panel ef-
fects.  Part II explains the limitations of existing empirical tests and 
then describes my approach for testing strategic accounts of panel de-
cision making.  In Parts III and IV, I present the results of the empiri-
cal tests and then consider the implications of my findings. 
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I. COMPETING EXPLANATIONS
A.  Panel Effects 
As described more fully in Part II, this study analyzes data on 
judges’ votes in Title VII sex discrimination cases.  In the analysis and 
discussion that follow, I characterize a vote in favor of the sex dis-
crimination plaintiff as “liberal” and a vote against the plaintiff as 
“conservative.”31  Table 1 shows that, as one might expect, the per-
centage of cases with a liberal outcome varies depending upon the 
composition of the panel. 
Table 1:  Federal Court of Appeals Decisions in Sex Discrimination  
Cases, 1995–2002, by Panel Composition
Panel
Composition
Number of
Observations
Percent Liberal
Outcomes
RRR 186 25.8%
RRD 354 38.4%
RDD 199 49.2%
DDD 48 79.2%
Table 2 further breaks down the data.  Consistent with prior stud-
ies, it shows that Democratic appointees vote in favor of plaintiffs in 
these cases more often than Republican appointees (51.9% of the 
time as compared with 34.2% of the time), but that judges’ votes are 
influenced by the partisan affiliation of the other members of the 
31 This treatment is consistent with prior studies of judicial decision making in sex 
discrimination and Title VII cases.  See, e.g., SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?,
supra note 10, at 19 (describing a vote for a plaintiff in a sex discrimination case as the 
“stereotypically liberal” vote); Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting, supra note 10, at 314 
tbl.1 (identifying a vote for the plaintiff in sex discrimination cases as voting for the 
liberal position); Boyd, Epstein & Martin, supra note 12, at 19 (treating pro-plaintiff 
votes in sex discrimination cases as liberal cases). 
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panel as well as their own.  For example, a Republican appointee sit-
ting with two Democratic appointees casts a liberal vote 44.2% of the 
time.  However, her voting pattern becomes steadily more conserva-
tive when she sits with one other Republican appointee (37.7% liberal 
votes) or two other Republican appointees (26.2% liberal votes).  A 
similar pattern holds true for Democratic appointees. 
Table 2:  Voting of Federal Court of Appeals Judges in  
Sex Discrimination Cases, 1995–2002, by Party of  
Appointing President and Panel Colleagues 
Republican Appointees Democratic Appointees 
Panel
Colleagues
Number of 
Observations
Percent
Liberal
Votes
Panel
Colleagues
Number of 
Observations
Percent
Liberal
Votes
DD 199 44.2% RR 354 41.5%
RD 708 37.7% DR 398 51.5%
RR 558 26.2% DD 144 78.5%
All cases 1465 34.2% All cases 896 51.9%
Of critical importance, the different outcomes across panel com-
position seen in Table 1 do not reflect only simple majoritarian voting.  
If judges naïvely voted their policy preferences and case outcomes 
were determined by majority vote, then judges would exhibit a stable 
voting pattern regardless of the identity of their panel colleagues.  As 
Table 2 clearly shows, this is not the case.  Alternatively, one might 
expect that a judge in the ideological minority might be influenced by 
her colleagues, but that the two judges in the ideological majority 
would not.  After all, the majority has the votes to achieve its policy 
goals directly.  Once again, however, this is not the case; judges in the 
ideological majority are also observed to vote differently when a judge 
affiliated with the opposing party is on the panel.  Thus, the phe-
nomenon of “panel effects” encompasses two distinct effects:  first, that 
judges in the majority vote differently (in a less stereotypically ideo-
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logical fashion) than judges on a homogeneous panel; and second, 
that judges in the minority vote differently (still less stereotypically 
ideologically) than judges in the majority. 
B.  Theoretical Accounts 
What accounts for these observed panel effects?  Scholars have 
proposed a variety of explanations, encompassing cultural, psycho-
logical, institutional, and strategic factors.  In order to frame an em-
pirical test, I group these explanations into three basic types.  As a ca-
veat, I do not mean to argue that this typology is canonical in any 
sense, and each type of explanation that I identify encompasses a 
number of diverse theories.  Rather than definitively categorizing theo-
ries, this typology merely serves to sharpen the empirical inquiry here. 
One type of explanation focuses on the relatively low dissent rates 
in court of appeals decisions.  A simple ideological model of voting 
would predict frequent dissents whenever a panel of judges is divided 
ideologically.  In fact, the proportion of federal appellate decisions 
containing dissents is quite low—around 10% overall.32  Some scholars 
explain the high levels of unanimity by positing the importance of a 
“norm of consensus.”33  Frequent dissents are thought to undermine 
institutional legitimacy and the clarity of legal rules,34 while unani-
mous decisions “promote the appearance of legal objectivity, cer-
tainty, and neutrality”35 and encourage compliance with the law.36
Other scholars emphasize the costliness of dissent to the individual 
judge.37  Writing a dissenting opinion requires time and effort, and it 
32 See HETTINGER ET AL., COLLEGIAL COURT, supra note 21, at 47 (noting that 9.5% 
of cases in the U.S. courts of appeals from 1960 to 1996 had dissents). 
33 For an overview, see, for example, CROSS, supra note 12, at 160, Burton M. At-
kins, Judicial Behavior and Tendencies Towards Conformity in a Three Member Small Group:  A 
Case Study of Dissent Behavior on the U.S. Court of Appeals, 54 SOC. SCI. Q. 41, 42-43 
(1973), and Farhang & Wawro, supra note 12, at 307 and sources cited therein. 
34 See HETTINGER ET AL., COLLEGIAL COURT, supra note 21, at 19 (claiming that 
unanimous decisions “may promote institutional legitimacy and effective implementa-
tion of individual decisions”); Edwards, supra note 3, at 1651 (“What the parties and 
the public need is [the best] answer, not a public colloquy among judges.”). 
35 Farhang & Wawro, supra note 12, at 307. 
36 See HETTINGER ET AL., COLLEGIAL COURT, supra note 21, at 19-20 (describing 
how “consensual decision making promotes the efficient administration of justice”). 
37 See, e.g., CROSS, supra note 12, at 160-61 (explaining why the decision not to dis-
sent may be a practical response to the costs of dissenting); SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE 
JUDGES POLITICAL?, supra note 10, at 64-66 (describing dissents on three-judge panels 
as “both futile and highly burdensome to produce”); Revesz, supra note 10, at 1733 
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may negatively impact a judge’s reputation and collegial relations,38
while offering very little payoff.  A dissent has no substantive effect on 
the outcome of a case, at least in the short term, and writing one does 
not relieve a judge of her responsibilities for drafting opinions in 
other cases.  These types of theories offer strong reasons that a judge 
in the ideological minority might often suppress her disagreement 
and go along with the decision of the majority. 
Although these theories of “suppressed dissent” offer a plausible 
account of why dissents are relatively infrequent on the courts of ap-
peals, they cannot explain panel effects more generally.  As noted 
above, panel composition influences not only the behavior of the mi-
nority judge, but the behavior of the judges who comprise the panel 
majority as well.39  As Revesz argued, if judges go along with their col-
leagues simply to avoid writing a dissent, one would predict that on 
mixed panels, “the single judge of one party [would be] the only one 
to moderate his or her views.”40
The costs of writing a dissent might lead a minority judge to avoid 
openly expressing her disagreement, but should have no impact on 
the votes of the panel majority.  Similarly, a norm of consensus has 
more explanatory power for minority than for majority judges.  Such a 
norm might sometimes induce the majority to accommodate the views 
of the minority, but it seems more likely to lead them to ignore the 
preferences of the minority, knowing that the strong norm of unanim-
ity will pressure the minority member to go along.41  Thus, while theo-
ries of dissent suppression are certainly relevant, they are insufficient 
to explain the observed influence of panel composition on the behav-
ior of both minority and majority judges on mixed panels. 
(suggesting that a judge may “moderate[] his or her views in order to avoid having to 
write a dissent”). 
38 See SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?, supra note 10, at 66 (“[D]issenting 
opinions might also cause a degree of tension among judges . . . .”).  Dissents force the 
majority judges to confront public disagreement with their conclusions and may oblige 
them to respond to arguments raised by the dissent or to more carefully defend the 
conclusions that they reach.  See Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 4, at 1017 (“Even one dis-
sident judge can impose upon me the cost, in time and aggravation, of having to re-
spond to a dissenting opinion . . . .”). 
39 See supra Section I.A. 
40 Revesz, supra note 10, at 1734. 
41 As Sunstein et al. point out, “a Democratic majority, or a Republican majority, 
has enough votes to do what it wishes.”  SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?, supra
note 10, at 12. 
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The second type of explanation—what I call “internal delibera-
tive” explanations—focuses on dynamics internal to the judicial panel.  
One such explanation is that panel effects are the product of collegial 
interactions among appellate judges.  This explanation is consistent 
with the way that many judges describe the decision-making process 
and has been advanced most forcefully by Judge Harry Edwards.  He 
writes that “if panel composition turns out to have a ‘moderating’ ef-
fect on judges’ voting behavior, this is a sign that panel members are 
behaving collegially.”42  As a judge on the D.C. Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, he found that copanelists listen to one another’s views and ar-
guments “seriously and respectfully, and . . . with open minds.”43  The 
result of this process of “collegial deliberation” is that individual 
judges sometimes shift their initial view of a case.44  In Edwards’s view, 
the observation that a judge’s vote is influenced by her copanelists is 
not merely unsurprising; it also illustrates the advantages of panel de-
cision making:  judges deliberate collegially, “discussing the case with 
each other and reaching a mutually acceptable judgment based on 
their shared sense of the proper outcome.”45
Sunstein and his coauthors propose another set of explanations 
that focuses on internal panel dynamics—explanations rooted in the 
findings of experimental psychology.  They cite studies documenting a 
“conformity effect,” where individuals in experimental settings are ob-
served to yield their views in the face of unanimous group opinion to 
the contrary,46 and argue that “judges are vulnerable to similar influ-
ences.”47  Analogizing the minority judge to the experimental subject 
confronted with a unanimous group opinion, they argue that the ten-
dency to conform to dominant opinion explains why dissents are far 
less common on the courts of appeals than a naïve ideological model 
42 Harry T. Edwards, Essay, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA.
L. REV. 1335, 1358 (1998). 
43 Id. at 1361. 
44 Edwards, supra note 3, at 1660 (describing shifts ranging from “refinement[s] 
and recharacterization[s]” to “change[s] in . . . the bottom line”). 
45 Edwards, supra note 42, at 1358. 
46 SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?, supra note 10, at 67.  As some of those 
authors explain in a different work, “[t]he yielding . . . occurs partly because of the in-
formation suggested by the unanimity of others; how could shared views be wrong?  
And it occurs partly because of reputational pressures; people do not want to stand out 
on a limb for fear that others will disapprove of them.”  Sunstein et al., Ideological Vot-
ing, supra note 10, at 339. 
47 SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?, supra note 10, at 69. 
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would predict.48  In order to explain the apparent moderation of ma-
jority judges on a mixed panel compared with their votes on a homo-
geneous panel, Sunstein et al. turn to another established finding in 
the experimental psychology literature:  group polarization.49  Specifi-
cally, after deliberating with a group of people with similar views, indi-
viduals tend to express more extreme views than they held before de-
liberation.50  Thus, “[d]eliberating groups of like-minded people tend 
to go to extremes.”51  Comparing an ideologically homogeneous panel 
to a group of “like-minded people,” Sunstein and his coauthors argue 
that the phenomenon of group polarization is at work, leading all-
Republican and all-Democrat panels to more extreme opinions than 
would be arrived at by mixed panels.52
In contrast to dissent-suppression theories and internal-
deliberative accounts, strategic explanations focus on interactions be-
tween the appellate judges on a panel and the other actors in the ju-
dicial system in order to explain panel effects.  These accounts posit 
that appellate judges do not pursue their policy goals naïvely, but 
rather act strategically, with an eye to the likely response of the Su-
preme Court or the court of appeals en banc.  For example, Virginia 
Hettinger, Stefanie Lindquist, and Wendy Martinek propose a strate-
gic explanation of when appellate judges dissent.  They hypothesize 
that circuit judges “may choose to dissent to signal the circuit en banc
that the majority panel opinion is contrary to circuit law or contrary to 
the preferences of the circuit majority,” or “to signal the Supreme 
Court and thereby invite review by that body.” 53
As they recognize, dissenting opinions might also be suppressed if 
circuit judges who disagree with the majority opinions nevertheless 
believe that en banc or Supreme Court review will produce an out-
come even worse—from their perspective—than the panel majority 
48 Id.
49 See id. at 71-72. 
50 Id. at 71.  Explanations for this phenomenon of group polarization include the 
limited pool of arguments available in a group of like-minded people, the desire of in-
dividuals to be perceived favorably by other group members, and the effect of corrobo-
ration in strengthening individual views.  Id. at 73-76. 
51 Id. at 71. 
52 See id. at 76.  There are serious reasons to doubt whether these findings from 
experimental psychology apply in the context of judicial decision making.  See infra
notes 147-148 and accompanying text. 
53 HETTINGER ET AL., COLLEGIAL COURT, supra note 21, at 41; see also CROSS, supra
note 12, at 156. 
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opinion.54  Thus, any prediction about whether or not a circuit judge 
will dissent “will depend on the configuration of preferences across the 
relevant actors:  the judge, the three-judge panel, and the circuit [or the 
Supreme Court] as a whole.”55  Their theory, however, focuses narrowly 
on the decision to dissent, rather than on panel effects generally. 
Cross and Tiller offer a closely related theory of how strategic be-
havior produces observed panel effects.  Similar to Hettinger and her 
coauthors, they assume that appellate judges use dissents as a signal to 
the Supreme Court or the circuit en banc.  However, they focus not 
on accounting for dissenting behavior, but on explaining why lower 
court judges obey precedent.56  Following doctrine poses no difficul-
ties where it leads to a result consistent with a circuit judge’s prefer-
ences.  However, when existing doctrine does not coincide with her 
policy goals, she may be tempted to disregard it.  In such a situation, 
Cross and Tiller theorize that a panel member who differs ideologi-
cally from the majority will act as a “whistleblower.”  By dissenting, the 
minority judge can “expose the majority’s manipulation or disregard 
of the applicable legal doctrine,”57 alerting a higher court to the dis-
obedient decision making and leading to reversal of the original ma-
jority opinion.  Alternatively, the threat to “expose disobedient deci-
sionmaking by the majority” may cause the majority to acknowledge its 
“disregard” of doctrine and decide to “keep its decision within the 
confines of doctrine.”58  Cross and Tiller therefore predict that “courts 
54 HETTINGER ET AL., COLLEGIAL COURT, supra note 21, at 41. 
55 Id.
56 Cross & Tiller, supra note 10, at 2156. 
57 Id.
58 Id. at 2159.  Judge Wald has expressed skepticism about this account based on 
her experience as a judge on the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit:  “[T]hreats of 
dissent are not particularly effective in changing a panel’s course.”  Patricia M. Wald, A
Response to Tiller and Cross, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 235, 253 (1999).  Judge Harry Edwards 
has been even more blunt, claiming that “the hypothesis is absurd.”  Edwards, supra
note 42, at 1337. 
 Cross and Tiller also suggest an alternative, psychologically based account of whis-
tleblower effects: 
Judges employ “cognitive shortcuts to process imperfect information” under 
the legal model, and these shortcuts produce apparently political results. . . . 
[T]he minority judge can serve as a whistleblower by revealing these biasing 
cognitive shortcuts.  Once the majority can no longer readily rationalize its 
decision under the legal model, it will frequently concede to the commands of 
that model. 
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are more likely to comply with doctrine . . . when the judicial panel is 
politically or ideologically divided.”59
This whistleblowing theory is consistent with models that positive 
political theorists commonly use to describe the judicial hierarchy.60
Briefly, these models analogize the relationship between the Supreme 
Court and the lower federal courts to a principal-agent relationship.  
The Supreme Court creates doctrine that their “agents,” the lower 
federal courts, are supposed to apply faithfully.  However, lower court 
judges have their own preferences and may be tempted to deviate 
from established doctrine.  Principal-agent models are thus centrally 
concerned with questions of supervision and control—that is, “[h]ow 
and to what extent can the Supreme Court control the behavior of 
lower federal courts to ensure that its policy dictates are imple-
mented?”61  One common answer is that lower federal court judges 
follow Supreme Court doctrine because they “fear exposure of any 
noncompliance and consequent reversal.”62  The Supreme Court, 
however, only reviews a tiny fraction of court of appeals decisions—
currently less than 1% per year.63  Cross and Tiller’s whistleblowing 
Cross & Tiller, supra note 10, at 2174.  Sunstein et al. use the whistleblower terminol-
ogy in this second sense—as a psychological rather than strategic explanation.  SUN-
STEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?, supra note 10, at 78-79. 
59 Cross & Tiller, supra note 10, at 2159. 
60 For a more detailed discussion of principal-agent models of the federal judicial 
hierarchy, see Kim, supra note 11, at 391-404. 
61 Id. at 393. 
62 Cross & Tiller, supra note 10, at 2158; see also George & Yoon, supra note 24, at 
822-25 (noting that the Supreme Court’s mechanism of control over lower courts is its 
power of reversal); McNollgast, supra note 22, at 1635-36 (modeling lower court judges 
“as strategic actors facing a trade-off between pursuing a personal policy agenda and 
seeing their decisions reversed by a higher court”); Songer, Segal & Cameron, supra
note 22, at 693 (“If an appeals court anticipates that it will be sanctioned in the form of 
a reversal, the anticipated response will keep the court in check.”). 
63 See Kim, supra note 11, at 397-98.  Scholars have suggested various mechanisms 
by which even a low rate of reversal might induce compliance.  For example, Songer, 
Segal, and Cameron hypothesize that litigant policing plays a crucial role, suggesting 
that losing parties are more likely to petition for Supreme Court review when the lower 
court opinion is “noncompliant,” thereby sounding a “fire alarm” that alerts the Court 
to cases of “flagrant doctrinal shirking.”  Songer, Segal & Cameron, supra note 22, at 
693.  McNollgast argue that the Supreme Court exercises effective control by establish-
ing a “doctrinal interval” of acceptable outcomes in order to induce lower courts to 
follow its precedents.  McNollgast, supra note 22, at 1645-46.  These explanations have 
been criticized on theoretical grounds, and the handful of relevant empirical studies 
generally do not support the theory that fear of reversal motivates lower court compli-
ance with doctrine.  See Kim, supra note 11, at 399-404 and sources cited therein; see
also CROSS, supra note 12, at 99-101. 
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theory offers one possible mechanism by which the Supreme Court 
might efficiently monitor and control the decisions of the courts of 
appeals—relying on dissenting opinions to signal cases of noncompli-
ance that warrant review. 
Theorists have similarly analogized the relationship between a cir-
cuit court and its three-judge panels to an agency relationship.64  On 
this view, individual judges are not free to decide as they like, but must 
act as “representatives” of the circuit.65  A three-judge panel is “de-
puted to hear and to determine cases in conformity with the law as the 
full court views it.”66  To ensure that this representative function is car-
ried out faithfully, the majority of the full circuit is permitted to over-
rule a panel decision by rehearing a case en banc.67  Like the Supreme 
Court, however, the circuit as a whole will find it costly to monitor the 
decisions of each panel.  To solve this monitoring problem, the circuit 
may rely on signals such as the presence of a dissenting opinion to de-
termine which cases to rehear en banc, and circuit court judges, aware 
of this possibility, may vote strategically in order to invite or avoid en 
banc review of a panel’s decision.68
Both Hettinger et al.’s strategic-dissent theory and Cross and 
Tiller’s whistleblower theory draw some support from the fact that the 
presence of a dissenting opinion is associated with both a greater like-
lihood that a case will be reheard en banc69 and that the Supreme 
Court will grant certiorari.70  However, this observed correlation does 
not necessarily prove that dissenting opinions cause the circuit en banc 
or the Supreme Court to review a case.  It may be that both the exis-
tence of a dissent and the decision to rehear or accept certiorari are 
the result of some underlying characteristic of the case—for example, 
64 E.g., George, supra note 26, at 245; Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 4, at 1011-13; 
Michael E. Solimine, supra note 4, at 49 (1988). 
65 Solimine, supra note 4, at 49. 
66 Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 4, at 1011. 
67 Solimine, supra note 4, at 49. 
68 Litigants may also play a role in monitoring panel decisions for the circuit, be-
cause they are more likely to petition for rehearing en banc if they believe that a panel 
decision is contrary to the preferences of the circuit majority.  See Michael W. Giles, 
Thomas G. Walker & Christopher Zorn, Setting a Judicial Agenda:  The Decision to Grant 
En Banc Review in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 68 J. POL. 852, 865 (2006) (presenting em-
pirical evidence that litigants’ decisions to seek en banc review are influenced by the 
ideological preferences of the panel relative to those of the circuit majority). 
69 George, supra note 26, at 267; Douglas H. Ginsburg & Brian M. Boynton, The 
Court En Banc:  1991–2002, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 259, 264 (2002); Ginsburg & Falk, 
supra note 4, at 1046. 
70 Caldeira, Wright & Zorn, supra note 22, at 563 tbl.1. 
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that it involves a particularly difficult or close legal issue.  Moreover, 
even if the relationship between dissents and further review is a causal 
one, a considerable gap remains between the large number of court 
of appeals cases containing dissents and the very limited number ac-
cepted for Supreme Court or en banc review.71  Thus, while the pres-
ence of a dissent may encourage the Supreme Court or circuit en 
banc to hear a case, it remains uncertain whether the possibility of a 
dissent and subsequent review actually influences the panel behavior 
of court of appeals judges. 
71 As discussed above, dissents occur in about 10% of federal appellate cases.  See
supra note 32 and accompanying text.  In contrast, the probability that a court of ap-
peals decision will be reviewed by the Supreme Court and the probability of review by 
the circuit en banc are quite small, with both events occurring in less than 1% of cases.  
See Kim, supra note 11, at 391 n.30 (“[T]he chance that a given court of appeals deci-
sion will be reviewed by the Supreme Court is approximately 0.14%.”); see also Michael 
W. Giles, Virginia A. Hettinger, Christopher Zorn & Todd C. Peppers, The Etiology of the 
Occurrence of En Banc Review in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 449, 450 
(2007) (explaining that while the incidence of en banc hearings varies significantly 
across circuits and across time, the incidence is “uniformly low”); Ginsburg & Boynton, 
supra note 69, at 266 tbl.6 (reporting that the percentage of cases heard en banc from 
1997 to 1999 varied between 0.10% and 0.58% depending upon the circuit); Ginsburg 
& Falk, supra note 4, at 1045 tbl.5 (reporting that 1.03% of argued cases and 0.2% of 
nonargued cases were reheard en banc by the D.C. Circuit from 1981 to 1990); 
Solimine, supra note 4, at 46 tbl.2 (reporting that less than 1% of court of appeals cases 
were heard en banc in the 1980s). 
 One might argue that the low percentage of cases actually reviewed by the Su-
preme Court or the circuit en banc does not necessarily indicate a lack of control by 
the reviewing courts, but rather the rate of review is low because control is effective 
and extensive oversight is not necessary.  Thus, the actual rate of review cannot estab-
lish the true level of effective control.   
 If, however, a reviewing court is relying on the threat of review to exercise control 
over panel decisions, that threat must be at least a credible one.  Cross describes the 
problem in the context of the Supreme Court: 
[T]here surely must be some credible threat of admonishment to maintain 
control on the playground.  It is doubtful that nine teachers (the Supreme 
Court justices), who are capable of admonishing at most around one hundred 
students a year, could effectively keep order on a playground populated by 
more than fifty thousand students. 
CROSS, supra note 12, at 100. 
 Given resource constraints, neither the Supreme Court nor the circuits have the 
capacity to increase significantly the proportion of panel decisions reviewed.  Thus, 
while the threat of review might sometimes make actual review unnecessary, the lim-
ited capacity of the reviewing courts suggests that fear of reversal may not play a domi-
nant role in appellate panel decision making. 
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II. TESTING THE STRATEGIC ACCOUNT
A.  Existing Evidence 
This empirical study is primarily focused on testing strategic ex-
planations for panel effects.  Although existing empirical evidence is 
consistent with both dissent-suppression and internal-deliberative 
theories, these explanations are difficult to test directly.  Support for 
these theories tends to come either from self-reports of circuit judges 
who emphasize the importance of collegiality72 or from the experi-
mental-psychology literature, which relies on behavior observed in 
laboratory settings.73  The reliability of self-reports is open to question, 
however, and, as discussed further in Section IV.B., the significant dif-
ferences between experimental settings and decision making by appel-
late judges raise serious doubts about the validity of extrapolating 
conclusions based on the former to explain the latter. 
On the other hand, the few empirical studies purporting to test 
strategic explanations for panel effects have produced mixed results.  
Hettinger et al. found no empirical support for the theory that court 
of appeals judges dissent strategically in order to signal the need for 
further review to either the circuit en banc or the Supreme Court.74
By contrast, Steven Van Winkle found that a judge in the ideological 
minority on a panel is more likely to dissent if that judge is aligned 
ideologically with the circuit majority, consistent with a signaling the-
ory.75  Similarly, Cross and Tiller claim to find empirical support for 
their whistleblower theory.76
These mixed results undoubtedly result in part from the different 
methods used to test for strategic effects.  For example, the Van Win-
kle and Cross-Tiller studies examined cases in specific issue areas—
72 See Edwards, supra note 42, at 1335; Wald, supra note 58, at 253.  See generally
Edwards, supra note 3. 
73 See SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?, supra note 10, at 67-76 (examining 
and citing studies about conformity effects and group polarization). 
74 HETTINGER ET AL., COLLEGIAL COURT, supra note 21, at 84 (“[W]e find no evi-
dence that strategic considerations come into play in the decision to file a dissenting 
opinion . . . .”).  More generally, Cross found no evidence to support the theory that 
circuit courts strategically moderate their rulings in light of Supreme Court prefer-
ences. See CROSS, supra note 12, at 122. 
75 Steven R. Van Winkle, Dissent as a Signal:  Evidence from the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals 15 (Aug. 29, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
76 Cross & Tiller, supra note 10, at 2172 (finding that “the presence of a whistle-
blower makes it almost twice as likely that doctrine will be followed when doctrine 
works against the partisan policy preferences of the court majority”). 
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search and seizure law77 and judicial review of agency actions,78 respec-
tively—that are acknowledged to be politically contested, while Het-
tinger et al. used a sample drawn from all court of appeals cases in a 
given time period, regardless of issue.79  If strategic behavior is more 
prominent in highly political—as compared with run-of-the-mill—
cases, these differences in sample selection might account for the di-
vergent results.80
Other modeling choices limit the usefulness of these studies in 
explaining panel effects.  Hettinger and her coauthors narrowly focus 
on the decision to dissent, and their model does not take into account 
panel effects more generally.  They begin with the assumption that the 
opinion in a case reflects the preferences of the majority-opinion 
writer and then examine the decisions of each of the other two judges 
to dissent or not, using variables that capture the preferences of the 
Supreme Court and the circuit en banc relative to the appellate judge.81
This approach has the advantage of offering a direct test of the 
theory that appellate judges’ dissenting behavior is influenced by the 
possibility and likely outcome of further review.  However, the model 
overlooks the interactions between judges in reaching a decision.  
More plausibly, a majority opinion will reflect the preferences of the 
two judges needed to agree on the outcome, and the third judge then 
faces the decision whether to go along with the majority or to dissent.  
By including data on both nonauthoring judges to model the decision 
to dissent, the approach of Hettinger et al. may underestimate the de-
gree to which strategic behavior occurs. 
Cross and Tiller’s empirical study, on the other hand, does not 
take into account the preferences of the reviewing courts, which are 
crucial to their whistleblower theory.  Analyzing D.C. Circuit decisions 
involving judicial review of agency actions, they show that ideologically 
mixed panels are far more likely to defer to agency decisions than 
ideologically unified panels.82  Assuming that deference indicates obe-
77 Van Winkle, supra note 75, at 10-11. 
78 Cross & Tiller, supra note 10, at 2162. 
79 HETTINGER ET AL., COLLEGIAL COURT, supra note 21, at 83. 
80 The cases analyzed by Hettinger et al. are not entirely without political content, 
however.  The authors report that “ideological disagreement” between the majority-
opinion writer and a potential dissenter—i.e., the distance between their ideology 
scores—does appear to influence the likelihood of dissent, even while the preferences 
of the Supreme Court or the circuit en banc do not.  Id. at 84 tbl.5. 
81 Id. at 78-80. 
82 Cross & Tiller, supra note 10, at 2172 (finding that unified panels gave Chevron
deference to agency action 33% of the time, whereas divided panels deferred 62% of 
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dience to doctrine, Cross and Tiller argue that this finding supports 
their theory.  The assumption that a decision not to defer to an 
agency equates with “disobedience” of doctrine is highly contestable.83
The critical weakness of their empirical test, however, is their failure 
to incorporate the reviewing court’s preferences.  According to their 
theory, by “threaten[ing] to highlight the disobedience externally to a 
higher court or to Congress,” the minority panel member induces the 
majority to conform to the law.84  However, this threat of “exposure 
and possible reversal” will only be effective if, in fact, the higher court 
or Congress is likely to agree with the minority judge that the majority 
is being “disobedient.”  In other words, if a whistleblower effect actu-
ally causes panel effects, then panel effects should depend upon the 
location of the reviewing court’s preferences relative to those of the 
minority judge. 
Cross and Tiller do not systematically examine the relationship 
between the preferences of the minority judge and the Supreme 
Court.  They report that mixed panels were more likely to defer to the 
agency (in their parlance, “obey” doctrine)85 given the presence of a 
potential whistleblower, but their results treat Democrat-majority and 
Republican-majority panels alike, even though the Supreme Court was 
dominated by Republican nominees during the entire time period of 
their study (1991–1995).  If whistleblowing works to “highlight . . . 
disobedience externally to a higher court,”86 then in an era with a con-
servative Supreme Court, the threat of whistleblowing should be most 
effective when a Republican minority judge threatens to expose a 
Democratic majority.  Cross and Tiller’s data, however, suggest that 
the time when deferring would result in an outcome counter to the majority’s policy 
preferences).
83 The relevant doctrine was laid out by the Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. 
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  Cross and Tiller assume 
that “obeying doctrine” requires deference to an agency’s policy, and that a failure to 
defer constitutes “disobedience.”  Chevron, however, does not require deference when 
the agency interpretation is contrary to the statute or the agency’s interpretation is 
“unreasonable.” Id. at 843-44.  Depending upon the circumstances, a decision not to 
defer in a particular case might be considered “obedient to doctrine” rather than the 
opposite.  Thus, without including case-specific information, the assumption that a de-
cision overturning an agency action is equivalent to “disobedience to doctrine” is un-
warranted.  Judge Edwards has similarly criticized Cross and Tiller’s assumption about 
what constitutes obedience to doctrine, arguing that their study “fundamentally mis-
understands the meaning of Chevron in a way that is fatal to the entire hypothesis.”  
Edwards, supra note 42, at 1356. 
84 Cross & Tiller, supra note 10, at 2159. 
85 Id. at 2172. 
86 Id. at 2159. 
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the opposite is true—they found that panels with a majority of De-
mocrats were, “if anything, more partisan than Republican panels.”87
At the same time, with a majority Republican Supreme Court, one 
would not expect a threat of dissent by a lone Democratic appointee 
to have much influence.  Yet, they found that “[t]he presence of a sin-
gle Democrat on a panel appears to have had a distinct . . . moderat-
ing effect on the two Republicans.”88  Thus, to the extent that Cross 
and Tiller examine the preferences of the Supreme Court relative to 
those of the panel members, their findings seem to undermine their 
strategic explanation for panel effects. 
B.  Constructing an Empirical Test 
In this Part I formalize the intuitions underlying a strategic ac-
count of panel decision making in order to generate predictions that 
can be tested against the data.  Before I do so, several caveats are in 
order.  First, a number of simplifying assumptions are necessary in or-
der to make the analysis tractable.  Consistent with a large and grow-
ing empirical literature on judicial decision making, I assume that 
judges—including the federal court of appeals judges studied here—
are motivated by their ideology or policy preferences.89  In using these 
terms, I do not mean to suggest that judges disregard the law.  In fact, 
considerable evidence indicates that law and legal doctrine constrain 
and shape the decisions of lower federal court judges.90  Nor do I 
87 Id. at 2174. 
88 Id. at 2173. 
89 While the assumption that judges are motivated by ideology has become com-
monplace, what scholars mean when they refer to “judicial ideology” is quite ambigu-
ous.  See Joshua B. Fischman & David S. Law, What Is Judicial Ideology, and How Do We 
Measure It?, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2009) (arguing that the empirical 
study of judicial ideology is subject to theoretical and methodological difficulties); 
Bryan D. Lammon, What We Talk About When We Talk About Ideology:  Judicial Politics 
Scholarship and Naive Legal Realism, 83 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (pointing 
out the lack of consistency in how the term “ideology” has been used in the judicial 
politics literature). 
90 See, e.g., John Gruhl, The Supreme Court’s Impact on the Law of Libel:  Compliance by 
Lower Federal Courts, 33 W. POL. Q. 502, 517-18 (1980) (finding that lower courts over-
whelmingly comply with Supreme Court decisions in the area of libel law); Charles A. 
Johnson, Research Note, Law, Politics, and Judicial Decision Making:  Lower Federal Court 
Uses of Supreme Court Decisions, 21 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 325, 333-34 (1987) (reporting evi-
dence that lower federal courts follow Supreme Court decisions); Donald R. Songer, 
The Impact of the Supreme Court on Trends in Economic Policy Making in the United States 
Courts of Appeals, 49 J. POL. 830, 839 (1987) (finding that Supreme Court decisions in 
the labor and antitrust areas had significant impact on decisional trends in the courts 
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mean to suggest that there is necessarily anything illegitimate about a 
judge’s pursuit of policy goals.  Legal doctrine can never be fully de-
terminate and judges are often called upon to exercise judgment in 
deciding cases.91  In those areas where the law “runs out,” judges’ at-
tention to the policy consequences of a decision is not only inevitable, 
but arguably quite appropriate. 
Although the model assumes that judges act strategically in pursu-
ing their policy goals, I avoid Cross and Tiller’s whistleblower termi-
nology because it suggests normative judgments about judicial motiva-
tion that are not empirically supported and are unnecessarily 
tendentious.  A whistleblower brings attention to otherwise covert 
wrongdoing, and thus, Cross and Tiller suggest that politically moti-
vated judges pursue their “partisan ambitions”92 by engaging in “ma-
nipulation or disregard of the applicable legal doctrine,”93 and that 
the “minority member acts as a whistleblower, ready to expose any 
cheating by the majority.”94  This account implies that legal doctrine 
provides clearly correct outcomes such that departures from doctrine 
can be identified easily and that judges deliberately disregard the law.  
Neither assumption is justified,95 nor is either necessary to a strategic 
theory of judicial decision making.  Thus, I reject the whistleblowing 
story and ask instead whether judges act strategically in the sense that 
they are influenced by the broader institutional context and not solely 
by conditions internal to the panel deciding a particular case. 
Also consistent with prior literature, I limit my focus to judicial 
votes.  Of course, judges do much more than simply decide cases for 
plaintiffs or defendants.  The reasons that they give to justify their de-
cisions are critical, for it is the content of opinions rather than the 
simple declaration of a winner that shapes the development of the 
law.  Particularly when studying panel effects, one risks missing a great 
deal by focusing only on votes.  Panelists undoubtedly deliberate not 
only over which party should win, but for what reasons.  They may bar-
of appeals); Songer & Sheehan, supra note 10, at 313 (finding nearly universal compli-
ance in courts of appeals with two significant Supreme Court decisions). 
91 See Kim, supra note 11, at 408-17 (discussing reasons that lower court judges in-
evitably have discretion when deciding cases). 
92 Cross & Tiller, supra note 10, at 2175. 
93 Id. at 2156. 
94 Id. at 2175. 
95 Legal commands are often open-ended, requiring the exercise of discretion.  
Because of this open-endedness, a pattern of judicial votes correlating with political 
preferences does not necessarily indicate disregard of the law.  See Kim, supra note 11, 
at 417. 
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gain over how broadly or narrowly a decision will be written, or how to 
frame the relevant doctrinal rule.  Thus, a minority panelist who joins 
a majority opinion may have influenced the reasoning or reach of the 
opinion even though the simple outcome appears unaffected. 
These more subtle forms of influence are difficult to detect and 
measure reliably, and, therefore, I focus here only on judicial votes.  
By studying votes, this empirical test captures only the clearest form of 
influence—that is, situations in which the expected direction of a 
judge’s vote changes.96
Finally, for purposes of this empirical test, I adopt the common 
convention of defining panel alignments in terms of partisan affilia-
tion.  When all three judges on an appellate panel were appointed by 
a President of the same party, the panel is considered “unified” or 
“homogeneous,” even though the individual judges on that panel 
likely hold a range of views.  Similarly, a “mixed panel” is one that in-
cludes judges appointed by both Republican and Democratic Presi-
dents, and the majority or minority status of any given judge depends 
upon the identity of the other panel members.  Thus, if a court of ap-
peals judge appointed by President Clinton is sitting with two judges 
appointed by President George H.W. Bush, she is the “minority” judge 
on that case, while the two Bush appointees are the “majority” judges.  
That same Clinton appointee might sit in another case with a Carter 
appointee and a Reagan appointee, and, for purposes of that case, she 
is a “majority” judge.  Unified panels (with three Democratic appoint-
ees or three Republican appointees) have neither “majority” nor “mi-
nority” judges. 
With these caveats aside, I consider the empirical implications of a 
strategic model.  Because such a model takes into account the broader 
institutional context, the preferences of the reviewing court should be 
an important factor in predicting when panel effects occur.  Consider 
the position of a judge who is in the political minority on a panel.97
96 As Farhang and Wawro argue, looking only at changes in voting behavior thus 
constitutes “a very conservative test” of panel effects.  Farhang & Wawro, supra note 12, 
at 313. 
97 In this analysis, I treat all judges sitting on a circuit court panel alike, regardless 
of their status.  In fact, not all judges who sit on circuit court panels are active federal 
circuit court judges.  Senior judges, appellate judges from other circuits, and district 
court judges sitting by designation may serve as one of the panelists, and it is possible 
that these judges interact with the other panelists differently because of their different 
status.  Due to data limitations, I do not explore this possibility here, although other 
scholars have found that status difference may affect panel interactions.  See James J. 
Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Designated Diffidence:  District Court Judges on the Courts of Ap-
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The other two judges are likely to vote in a manner inconsistent with 
her preferred outcome.  She thus faces a choice:  she can vote her sin-
cere preference, which would entail writing a dissenting opinion, or 
she can go along with the majority opinion. 
If she acts strategically, she will decide between these two courses 
of action by considering whether dissenting is likely to provoke fur-
ther review and result in a final outcome closer to her preferences, or 
whether it will be a futile act that will not affect the ultimate resolution 
of the case.  And whether or not a dissent is likely to produce a result 
more to her liking will in turn depend upon the preferences of the re-
viewing court.98  The more closely aligned the preferences of the mi-
nority judge and the reviewing court, the more likely it is that the re-
viewing court will view her dissent as a signal that the majority 
decision should be reviewed, and the more likely that the minority 
judge will prefer the reviewing court’s resolution of the case to that of 
the panel majority.  In such a situation, the minority judge would have 
an enhanced incentive to dissent. 
An analysis focused solely on the dissenting behavior of the minor-
ity judge is seriously incomplete, however, for if the strategic account 
is correct, then the threat of dissent may induce the panel majority to 
change its decision in some instances, thereby making actual dissent 
unnecessary.  Consider, for example, a case in which two of the panel 
members are Democratic appointees and agree on a particular out-
come, such as a decision in favor of a plaintiff in an employment dis-
crimination case.  The minority judge, a Republican appointee, ex-
presses her disagreement with the proposed outcome, and indicates 
that she will file a dissent explaining why she believes the majority 
peals, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 565, 567 (2001) (reporting that district court judges sitting 
by designation perform differently than the circuit court judges with whom they sit); 
Paul M. Collins, Jr. & Wendy L. Martinek, The Small Group Context:  Designated Dis-
trict Court Judges in the United States Courts of Appeals 21 (Apr. 22, 2008) (unpub-
lished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120957 (finding that dis-
trict court judges sitting by designation are more deferential to their court of appeals 
colleagues in a subset of cases); cf. Ginsburg & Boynton, supra note 69, at 260 (report-
ing that a significant proportion of cases reheard en banc by the D.C. Circuit had been 
decided by a panel that included a visiting judge in the majority). 
98 I simplify here by focusing on the preferences of the reviewing court.  In fact, 
whether or not a case is reviewed by the Supreme Court or reheard by the circuit en 
banc depends upon litigant choices regarding whether or not to seek further review, as 
well as the decisions of the reviewing court to hear a case or not.  Empirical evidence 
exists, however, that these litigant choices are themselves influenced by the prefer-
ences of the circuit panel relative to the reviewing court.  See Giles, Walker & Zorn, su-
pra note 68, at 865; Songer, Segal & Cameron, supra note 22, at 693. 
1346 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 157: 1319
opinion to be wrong.  If the majority judges perceive that the review-
ing court is likely to agree with the minority judge, they might choose 
to modify their opinion, either moderating their reasoning sufficiently 
to entice the minority judge to join or changing the outcome alto-
gether and deciding in favor of the employer in order to avoid a dis-
sent and the increased risk that their decision will be reversed.99  On 
the other hand, if the minority judge’s preference is further from the 
reviewing court’s than from the majority’s, the minority judge is less 
likely to dissent, and, if she does so, her dissent is less likely to signal 
the need for review.  Knowing this, the majority judges will be less 
likely to accommodate the minority judge or to moderate their own 
views.  Thus, the strategic account predicts that both the decision of a 
minority judge to dissent and the willingness of the majority to ac-
commodate the minority depend upon the preferences of the review-
ing court. 
Because strategic effects might be observed either when a minority 
judge chooses to dissent or when a majority judge changes his vote, it 
is important to capture both possibilities when empirically testing for 
panel effects.100  At one extreme, if the threat of dissent were wholly 
effective, dissent rates by minority judges would be no higher under 
conditions in which they had an enhanced incentive to dissent than 
otherwise.  Instead, one would observe only an increased willingness 
on the part of majority judges to decide cases in accordance with the 
99 Cross and Tiller argue, consistently with much of the positive political theory 
literature on the judicial hierarchy, that the fear of “exposure and possible reversal” 
may induce the majority to follow doctrine.  Cross & Tiller, supra note 10, at 2159, 
2173.  Implicit in this argument is the suggestion that reversal by a higher court inflicts 
greater costs on the lower court judge than simply the loss of her preferred outcome.  
See, e.g., George & Yoon, supra note 24, at 822 (noting that lower court judges may per-
ceive the costs of reversal as higher than a rational-actor model would predict because 
of their desire for promotion).  If this were not the case, the rational policy-seeking 
judge would prefer a risk that her favored outcome will be overturned to the certainty 
that the case will be decided according to the reviewing court’s preferences and not 
her own.  There are reasons to be skeptical of this explanation.  See Kim, supra note 11, 
at 402-04 (discussing empirical studies that fail to support the theory that fear of rever-
sal motivates compliance by lower courts).  However, it is also possible that a judge who 
otherwise anticipates reversal may prefer to accommodate the minority judge regard-
ing the outcome—who wins—in order to retain some control over the rationale articu-
lated in the case. 
100 In their test of a strategic model, Hettinger et al. focus only on the decision to 
dissent, and not on any change in the voting behavior of majority judges.  See HET-
TINGER ET AL., COLLEGIAL COURT, supra note 21, at 47-48.  Quite possibly, they found 
no evidence of strategic behavior because they examined only one aspect of the poten-
tial strategic interaction among appellate panelists. 
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preferences of the minority judge in those situations.  More realisti-
cally, if the strategic account is correct, minority judges will sometimes 
be encouraged to dissent and majority judges will sometimes be in-
duced to moderate or modify their opinions when the conditions cre-
ating an enhanced incentive to dissent exist (i.e., the minority judge is 
more closely aligned with the reviewing court than with the panel ma-
jority).  Thus, understanding panel effects requires an examination of 
the voting patterns of both the panel minority and majority. 
In order to capture the behavior of both minority and majority 
judges on mixed panels, I do not analyze the ideological direction of a 
judge’s vote (liberal or conservative) as in past studies, but whether a 
judge’s vote is “counter-ideological.”  In focusing on counter-
ideological votes, I do not mean to imply that judges’ other votes are 
ideological in the sense of being driven or solely motivated by ideol-
ogy.  Rather, counter-ideological is simply a shorthand for identifying 
votes contrary to what a naïve ideological model would predict. 
If judges simply voted ideologically, Democrat-appointed judges 
would always vote liberally and Republican-appointed judges always 
conservatively.  They do not do so, of course, because many factors 
beyond policy goals or political preferences influence their decisions.  
At the same time, there is an observed correlation between partisan 
affiliation and voting, and that correlation is muted when Democrat- 
and Republican-appointed judges sit together.  Panel effects, then, are 
simply the increased tendency for judges to vote counter-ideologically 
when sitting with judges affiliated with the other party.  Examining the 
conditions under which appellate judges vote counter-ideologically 
thus offers a way to test whether the preferences of the reviewing 
court influence panel effects. 
I use a traditional spatial model to identify the situations in which 
the minority judge is more closely aligned with the reviewing court 
than with the panel majority, and, therefore, would have an enhanced 
incentive to dissent according to the strategic account.  Following 
conventions in the judicial-politics literature, I assume that judges 
have an “ideal point” that represents their preferred outcome in a 
given case in some ideological space usually characterized along a lib-
eral/conservative dimension.  Under a strategic model, judges vote in 
a manner that will maximize their preferences by producing an out-
come as close as possible to their ideal point, taking into account the 
likely response of other actors in the system. 
Consider a situation in which the preferences of the panel minor-
ity and majority members are arrayed as follows: 
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Figure 1:  Relative Preferences of Judges on Appellate Panel 
                     RC1                                                RC2
-----------|------|---------------|---------------|-------------------|-------------|-------------------- 
                             M1         Mmed          M2                           m
The two majority members (M1 and M2) will agree on an outcome 
at the median (Mmed) of their respective preferences.  The minority 
judge (m) faces a choice of dissenting from or joining the majority 
opinion.101  If she joins the majority opinion, the outcome represents a 
loss to the extent that the majority opinion at Mmed departs from her 
preferred outcome at m.  If she dissents, her dissent may serve as a 
signal, increasing the probability that the majority’s decision will be 
reviewed, either by the Supreme Court or the circuit en banc.  If the 
reviewing court’s preferences fall at RC1, the minority judge will be 
worse off than if the majority opinion were never reviewed, given that 
RC1 is more distant from m than Mmed.  On the other hand, if the re-
viewing court’s preference falls at RC2, the minority judge will prefer 
the outcome reached by the reviewing court to that of the panel ma-
jority, and will have an enhanced incentive to dissent.  Thus, accord-
ing to the strategic account, the minority judge should be more likely 
to dissent when the reviewing court’s preference is located at RC2 than 
at RC1.
More generally, the minority judge should have an enhanced in-
centive to dissent whenever her preferences fall closer to the review-
ing court’s than to those of the panel majority.  Knowing this, and 
seeking to avoid review and reversal, the panel majority should be 
more likely to accommodate the minority member under these cir-
cumstances as well. 
101 In reality, the minority judge does not face such a simple binary choice, be-
cause there is always the possibility that she can bargain with the majority to try to 
achieve a decision that falls somewhere between Mmed and m.  Assuming that the major-
ity and the minority disagree on which party should win—and not just on the ration-
ale—the observable outcomes remain the same:  either the minority judge dissents or 
she joins the majority.  It may be the case that the minority judge joins the majority 
because they have moderated the reasoning in their opinion even though the outcome 
appears unchanged.  It is also possible that the majority and minority judges never dis-
agreed on the outcome, but only on the appropriate rationale, such that the minority 
judge must choose between joining the majority opinion or concurring separately.  As 
discussed above, the focus here on judicial votes means that the empirical test will not de-
tect these more subtle forms of panel influence, but will only capture the strongest form 
of interaction—a change in voting behavior.  See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
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Thus, if the strategic account is correct, the propensity of any 
given judge to vote counter-ideologically will be influenced not only 
by the preferences of the other two judges on a panel, but also by 
where the preference of the reviewing court falls in relation to the 
panel’s preferences.  The diagram below identifies graphically the 
situations in which the minority judge has an enhanced incentive to 
dissent (and the majority, a corresponding incentive to accommo-
date).  If the preference of the reviewing court falls in the shaded area 
B, the minority judge’s preference will be closer to the reviewing 
court’s than to the panel majority’s, and therefore the minority judge 
will prefer the reviewing court’s chosen outcome to the majority’s 
resolution of the case.  This area is bounded by Mmed (the median of 
the ideal points of the two majority judges) and M'med (where the dis-
tance from m to M'med is equal to the distance from Mmed to m). 
Figure 2:  Relative Preferences of Reviewing Court Creating  
Enhanced Incentive for Minority Judge to Dissent 
RC :
A B C 
----------------------------------|------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|------------                   
                             Mmed                                   m                                  M'med                     
Expressed mathematically, the minority judge is more closely aligned 
with the reviewing court, and will therefore have an enhanced incen-
tive to dissent, whenever 
| RC – m |  <  | Mmed – m |. 
Combining panel composition and the relative preferences of the 
reviewing court produces five different voting conditions (depicted in 
Figure 3) that may influence appellate voting.  Simple panel effects 
predict that majority judges on mixed panels (conditions 2 and 4) will 
be more likely to vote counter-ideologically than judges on unified 
panels (condition 1), and that minority judges on mixed panels (con-
ditions 3 and 5) will be more likely to vote counter-ideologically than 
majority judges on mixed panels (conditions 2 and 4).  Considering 
strategic effects suggests another set of predictions:  When the minor-
ity judge is aligned with the reviewing court (condition 5), the minor-
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ity judge will be more likely to vote her true preferences and dissent, 
and therefore less likely to vote counter-ideologically than when her 
preferences are not so aligned (condition 3).  For a majority judge the 
reverse should be true.  She will be more likely to vote counter-
ideologically when the minority is aligned with the reviewing court 
(condition 4) in order to avoid the risk of review and reversal than 
otherwise (condition 2). 
Figure 3:  Voting Conditions for Judges on Three-Judge Panels
Mixed PanelUnified Panel 
Majority  
Judge 
Minority 
Judge 
Minority judge and 
reviewing court  
nonaligned 
2 3
Minority judge and 
reviewing court 
are aligned 
1
4 5
Note:  Cells illustrate five situations in which the incentives of a 
judge on a three-judge panel are hypothesized to vary. 
C.  Data and Empirical Analysis 
In order to test the strategic account of panel effects, I use appel-
late voting data in employment discrimination cases alleging sex dis-
crimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.102  These 
102 The data used here were originally collected by Sunstein and his colleagues, 
and formed the basis for their conclusions about ideological voting and panel effects 
in sex discrimination cases.  See Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting, supra note 10, at 319-
20 (concluding that there was ideological voting in sex discrimination cases).  As they 
report, these data were collected by searching Lexis for “sex! discrimination or sex! 
harassment” for the time period from January 1, 1995, through December 31, 2002.  
Id. at 312 n.29.  The search results were filtered to exclude cases that did not actually 
involve sex discrimination, id. at 311 n.20, resulting in a data set of 1007 cases.  Id. at 
312 n.29.  This data set was then culled to include only those cases involving claims 
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data are analyzed to determine whether panel effects differ depend-
ing upon the preferences of the Supreme Court or the circuit as a 
whole.  The data comprise 2361 judicial votes from 787 cases involving 
allegations of sex discrimination in employment—including sexual 
harassment cases—decided by three-judge panels of the federal courts 
of appeals from 1995 to 2002, inclusive.  The data include a mix of cases 
decided by panels of different composition, as seen in Table 1. 
As in most prior studies documenting panel effects, the data ana-
lyzed here are limited to published opinions.103  One might justify 
such a limitation on the grounds that unpublished opinions are “sim-
ple and straightforward” and do not “involve difficult or complex is-
sues of law.”104  In fact, however, scholars have found that a significant 
percentage of unpublished opinions are substantively significant,105
that ideological voting is observed in unpublished as well as published 
decisions,106 and that a significant number of opinions reversing the 
lower court are never published.107  Other work has shown that the cri-
teria for publication and the level of specificity of those criteria vary 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in order to control for the basis of suit, 
resulting in a data set of 787 cases, and information was added about the judges, in-
cluding their Judicial Common Space ( JCS) scores.  The empirical analysis in this Arti-
cle utilizes this revised data set, which was created by Boyd et al. and used by them to 
analyze the effect of judges’ sex on voting.  See Boyd, Epstein & Martin, supra note 12. 
103 E.g., SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?, supra note 10, at 18 (explaining 
the decision to limit the sample to published opinions); Farhang & Wawro, supra note 
12, at 310-11 (describing the data set as one comprised of published opinions); Miles & 
Sunstein, supra note 12, at 825 (noting that the sample used consists of published deci-
sions); Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting, supra note 10, at 313 (“Our sample is limited to 
published opinions.”). 
104 SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?, supra note 10, at 18. 
105 See Pamela Foa, Comment, A Snake in the Path of the Law:  The Seventh Circuit’s 
Non-Publication Rule, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 309, 315-16 (1977) (finding unpublished deci-
sions in the Seventh Circuit with potential precedential value). 
106 See, e.g., David S. Law, Strategic Judicial Lawmaking:  Ideology, Publication, and Asy-
lum Law in the Ninth Circuit, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 817, 843 (2005) (finding that ideology 
significantly influenced the outcome of unpublished decisions); Deborah Jones Merritt 
& James J. Brudney, Stalking Secret Law:  What Predicts Publication in the United States 
Courts of Appeals, 54 VAND. L. REV. 71, 109 (2001) (observing that Democratic judges 
vote differently than Republican judges in unpublished labor cases); Donald R. Son-
ger, Criteria for Publication of Opinions in the U.S. Courts of Appeals:  Formal Rules Versus Em-
pirical Reality, 73 JUDICATURE 307, 312 (1990) (finding that panels with Democratic ma-
jorities were more likely to make liberal decisions than those with Republican majorities 
in unpublished decisions). 
107 See William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publica-
tion in the United States Courts of Appeals:  The Price of Reform, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 617-
18 (1981) (noting that a portion of unpublished circuit court opinions reverse the de-
cisions below). 
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widely from circuit to circuit and that publication rates differ signifi-
cantly depending upon the circuit and the authoring judge.108  Most 
relevant here, panel effects have been documented in unpublished as 
well as published cases.109
Omitting unpublished opinions raises the concern that the deci-
sion whether or not to publish is itself subject to strategic calculation, 
and, therefore, that panel effects may differ between published and 
unpublished opinions.110  One might speculate, for example, that stra-
tegic judges seek “to publish decisions that they support on ideological 
grounds, and to leave unpublished cases in which they find themselves 
compelled to reach ideologically undesirable results.”111  Because mi-
nority judges may threaten to dissent in order to engage the majority in 
bargaining, David Law hypothesizes that ideologically mixed panels 
might be less likely to publish than homogeneous panels.112  However, 
in his study of Ninth Circuit decisions in asylum cases, he found no sig-
nificant evidence that panel homogeneity affects the publication deci-
sion.113  Similarly, Merritt and Brudney concluded in an earlier study of 
labor law cases that no difference in publication rates existed between 
unified and mixed panels.114  Thus, although the omission of unpub-
lished opinions is a limitation of this study and cautions against over-
generalizing its results, earlier work offers some reassurance that panel 
effects can be meaningfully studied using only published opinions. 
For the reasons explained above, I use counter-ideological vote as 
a way of measuring panel effects.  In order to test the influence of the 
reviewing court’s preferences on observed panel effects, I use a logit 
model with counter-ideological vote as the dependent variable.  Coun-
ter-ideological vote is coded 1 if a judge voted in the opposite direc-
tion from that predicted by her party affiliation under a naïve voting 
model (e.g., a Democratic appointee votes conservatively) and 0 if she 
voted consistently with her party affiliation (e.g., a Republican ap-
pointee votes conservatively).  Because all of the cases in the data set 
108 Law, supra note 106, at 823-24 and sources cited therein. 
109 Id. at 848. 
110 Based on her experiences on the court of appeals, Judge Patricia Wald reports 
that judges on a panel may “occasionally compromise . . . on an unpublished, nonpre-
cedential judgment/memorandum rather than a published opinion.”  Wald, supra
note 58, at 253-54. 
111 Law, supra note 106, at 838. 
112 Id. at 839. 
113 Id. at 861-62. 
114 Merritt & Brudney, supra note 106, at 97. 
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involve claims of sex discrimination, I assume that a vote in favor of 
the plaintiff is “liberal” and a vote in favor of the defendant is “conser-
vative.”  Dummy variables capture the five voting conditions illustrated 
in Figure 3.  I omit the variable for unified panels and include dummy 
variables for each of the other four conditions of interest:  a majority 
judge voting when the minority judge is not aligned with the review-
ing court (condition 2); a majority judge voting when the minority 
judge is so aligned (condition 4); and a minority judge voting when 
not aligned (condition 3) and aligned (condition 5) with the review-
ing court. 
In order to capture the relative preferences of the judges as well as 
the reviewing court, I use Judicial Common Space scores ( JCS 
scores).115  Rather than treating all judges affiliated with a given politi-
cal party alike, JCS scores take into account the norm of senatorial 
courtesy, using information about an appointee’s home-state senators 
as well as the nominating President to assign scores.116  The result is a 
set of ideology scores for court of appeals judges that reflects differ-
ences in ideology between different Presidents of the same party and 
the Senate’s role in the judicial selection process.  Preferences of the 
Supreme Court Justices are included by transforming the Martin-
115 JCS scores are intended to provide a “reliable and valid measurement strategy 
for placing judges of lower courts and justices of higher courts in the same policy 
space.”  Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Jeffrey A. Segal & Chad Westerland, The Judi-
cial Common Space, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 303, 305 (2007) [hereinafter Epstein et al., 
Judicial Common Space].  The JCS scores build on the NOMINATE Common Space 
scores developed by Keith Poole to estimate ideology scores for Representatives, Sena-
tors, and Presidents in a two-dimensional issue space.  See id. at 306 (explaining how 
NOMINATE Common Space scores are developed); see also HETTINGER ET AL., COLLE-
GIAL COURT, supra note 21, at 50-51 (describing how Poole’s ideology scores were used 
to estimate ideology scores for federal appellate judges); Keith T. Poole, Recovering a 
Basic Space from a Set of Issue Scales, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 954, 954 (1998). 
116 Giles, Hettinger, and Peppers developed a method for estimating ideology 
scores for federal lower court judges that takes into account the norm of senatorial 
courtesy—that is, the tradition that “presidents consult with senators who share their 
partisan affiliation and who represent the state in which the vacancy has arisen.”  HET-
TINGER ET AL., COLLEGIAL COURT, supra note 21, at 50.  The basic strategy is to 
assign each judge appointed to the circuit bench in the absence of senatorial 
courtesy the Poole ideology score corresponding to his or her appointing 
president.  However, for those judges appointed when there was one home-
state senator of the president’s party, Giles, Hettinger, and Peppers give those 
judges the Poole ideology score corresponding to that home-state senator.  
When both home-state senators were of the president’s party, the correspond-
ing ideology score for the judge is equal to the average Poole score of the two 
senators.
Id. at 50-51. 
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Quinn scores,117 which estimate the ideal points of Supreme Court Jus-
tices based on judicial votes, onto the Common Space scale.118  Thus, 
JCS scores provide estimates of the ideology scores or ideal points of 
all federal court of appeals judges and U.S. Supreme Court Justices on 
a common scale. 
Consistent with prior literature, I use the party of the appointing 
President to determine whether a panel is “unified” or “mixed” and, 
on a mixed panel, to identify the majority and minority judges.  Once 
the majority or minority status of judges on mixed panels has been de-
termined, the JCS scores are then used to calculate the distance be-
tween the preferences of the minority judge and the panel majority 
(defined as the midpoint between the JCS scores of the two majority 
members) and the distance between the preferences of the minority 
judge and the reviewing court.  Those distances are then used to de-
termine whether the preferences of the minority judge are more 
closely aligned with the reviewing court than with the panel majority 
(conditions 4 and 5), or whether they are not so aligned (conditions 2 
and 3).119
Because the reviewing court might appropriately be viewed as ei-
ther the Supreme Court or the circuit en banc, I test for the effects of 
each in separate estimations.  The Supreme Court’s preference is set 
at the JCS score of the median Justice.  The preferences of circuit 
courts en banc are measured by the JCS score of the median judge on 
that circuit. 
Both gender and party serve as important control variables.  Plain-
tiffs lose more often than they win in employment discrimination 
cases,120 and therefore Democratic appointees may appear to vote 
counter-ideologically more often than Republican judges when they 
are merely voting consistently with the overall trend in these cases.  
Because I want to isolate the effects of panel composition on counter-
ideological voting, the judge’s party affiliation must be taken into ac-
count.  The gender of the judge is also potentially significant, given 
117 See Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via 
Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134, 
135 (2002). 
118 See Epstein et al., supra note 115, at 310 fig.1. 
119 Recall that, in this model, a minority judge is “aligned” with the reviewing court, 
and therefore has an enhanced incentive to dissent, whenever | RC – m |  <  | Mmed – m |. 
120 See generally Kevin M. Clermont, Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, How 
Employment-Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 7 EMP. RTS. &
EMP. POL’Y J. 547 (2003) (reporting evidence that defendants win the majority of em-
ployment discrimination cases in federal court). 
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that the data set consists of sex discrimination cases.  A number of 
studies have found that female court of appeals judges are more likely 
to vote in favor of plaintiffs in sex discrimination suits.121  Because the 
dependent variable here is counter-ideological vote, however, the ef-
fect of gender will depend upon party affiliation.  Democratic female 
judges may be less likely to vote counter-ideologically, all else equal, 
given that a counter-ideological vote will favor the defendant in a sex 
discrimination case.  Conversely, Republican female judges may be 
more likely to vote counter-ideologically, all else equal, given that a 
counter-ideological vote for them will favor the plaintiff.  In order to 
take these effects into account, I include dummy variables to capture 
the gender and party affiliation of the judge. 
Prior literature also suggests the importance of controlling for the 
direction of the decision below.  It is well documented that courts of 
appeals are far more likely to affirm than reverse the decisions of dis-
trict court judges.122  If a counter-ideological vote requires reversing a 
lower court, one might expect that it will be less likely to occur than if 
the counter-ideological vote involves an affirmance.  I control for this 
affirmance effect by including a variable to capture whether the appel-
late judge would be required to reverse the decision below in order to 
vote counter-ideologically (coded 1 when the lower court decision was 
conservative and the judge is Republican or when the lower court de-
cision was liberal and the judge is Democratic, and coded 0 otherwise). 
121 See, e.g., Sue Davis, Susan Haire & Donald R. Songer, Voting Behavior and Gender 
on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 77 JUDICATURE 129, 131 (1993) (finding that “[m]ore than 
63% of the votes cast by women judges supported the plaintiff’s claim of [employ-
ment] discrimination,” in contrast to 46% of the votes by male judges); Farhang & 
Wawro, supra note 12, at 319 (determining that female judges are more likely than 
male judges to vote for the plaintiff in an employment discrimination suit); Peresie, 
supra note 12, at 1776 (finding that “being female increased the probability that a 
judge found for the plaintiff . . . by 65% . . . in sex discrimination cases”); Boyd, Ep-
stein & Martin, supra note 12, at 19 (“On average, the probability of female judges vot-
ing in favor of the plaintiff in a sex discrimination case is between 0.10 and 0.12 higher 
than it is for male judges . . . .”); Nancy Crowe, The Effects of Judges’ Sex and Race on 
Judicial Decisionmaking on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 1981–1996, at xii (1999) (un-
published manuscript, on file with author) (finding that female judges are more likely 
than male judges to vote in favor of plaintiffs in sex discrimination cases).  But see
Sarah Westergren, Gender Effects in the Courts of Appeals Revisited:  The Data Since 1994, 92 
GEO. L.J. 689, 704-05 (2004) (finding statistically insignificant differences in male and 
female judges’ votes in sex discrimination cases when controlling for race, party, and 
sex of the plaintiff). 
122 See Chris Guthrie & Tracey E. George, The Futility of Appeal:  Disciplinary Insights 
into the “Affirmance Effect” on the United States Courts of Appeals, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 357, 
358 (2005) (reporting that federal courts of appeals affirmed 90% of the cases decided 
in recent decades). 
1356 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 157: 1319
In addition, a variable was added for ideological extremity on the 
theory that judges with ideal points farther from the center are more 
likely to be ideological in the colloquial sense of rigidly pursuing their 
policy goals and being less willing to compromise with their copanel-
ists and vote in a counter-ideological direction.  JCS scores range from 
-1 to 1, and, therefore, I measure ideological extremity as the absolute 
value of a judge’s JCS score.  In other words, the more distant the 
judge’s score from zero, whether in a positive or negative direction, 
the more ideologically extreme she is assumed to be. 
Table 3 briefly summarizes the variables used in the model and 
provides summary statistics of the data. 
Table 3:  Model Variables and Basic Descriptive Statistics  
for Votes of Federal Court of Appeals Judges in 
 Sex Discrimination Cases, 1995–2002 
Variable
Number of Observations 
(% of total sample)
Counter-Ideological Vote 932 (39.5%) 
Condition 1:
Vote on Unified Panel
702 (29.7%) 
Condition 2: 
Majority Judge Vote when Minority Judge and
Circuit Nonaligned 
176 (7.4%) 
Condition 3:
Minority Judge Vote when Minority Judge and
Circuit Nonaligned 
88 (3.7%) 
Condition 4:
Majority Judge Vote when Minority Judge and
Circuit Aligned 
930 (39.4%) 
Condition 5:
Minority Judge Vote when Minority Judge and
Circuit Aligned 
465 (19.7%) 
Condition 2:
Majority Judge Vote when Minority Judge and
Supreme Court Nonaligned 
60 (2.5%) 
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Variable
Number of Observations 
(% of total sample)
Condition 3:
Minority Judge Vote when Minority Judge and
Supreme Court Nonaligned 
30 (1.3%) 
Condition 4: 
Majority Judge Vote when Minority Judge and
Supreme Court Aligned 
1046 (44.3%) 
Condition 5:
Minority Judge Vote when Minority Judge and
Supreme Court Aligned 
523 (22.2%) 
Republican Male 1356 (57.4%) 
Republican Female 109 (4.62%) 
Democratic Male 671 (28.4%) 
Democratic Female 225 (9.5%) 
Reversal Required for Counter-Ideological Vote 1314 (55.6%) 
Ideological Extremity VALUES: Min = 0.003 
Mean = 0.326 
Max = 0.791 
Prior studies of panel effects have included a variable to capture 
circuit fixed effects.123  This is important for models that use “ideologi-
cal direction of vote” as the dependent variable, because circuits vary 
considerably in their liberal or conservative orientation, and, there-
fore, the baseline propensity to vote in a liberal or conservative direc-
tion differs significantly.  When using counter-ideological votes as the 
dependent variable, however, the theoretical case for including circuit 
fixed effects is much less certain.  One might hypothesize that circuit 
cultures vary in terms of the emphasis placed on consensus, but the 
impact of these differences on counter-ideological voting is somewhat 
ambiguous, given that either the minority or majority judges might 
accommodate the opposing viewpoint.  If it is true that circuit culture 
varies in this way, then the behavior of judges in each of the  
123 See, e.g., SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?, supra note 10, app.; Farhang 
& Wawro, supra note 12, at 315; Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting, supra note 10, app. 
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relevant voting conditions depicted in Figure 1 might differ depend-
ing upon the circuit.  In other words, the theoretical argument for 
controlling for circuit would require that the model include not only 
circuit fixed effects, but also variables to capture the interaction be-
tween circuit and each of the different voting conditions, rendering 
the model unmanageably large.  Thus, the results and discussion here 
rely on models that exclude circuit fixed effects.  In the Appendix, I 
report the results when simple circuit fixed effects are included in the 
model.  The basic substantive results are quite similar. 
III. RESULTS
A.  The Supreme Court as Reviewing Court 
Table 4 presents the results of the logistic regression for counter-
ideological votes, treating the Supreme Court as the reviewing court.124
Examining the control variables reveals that only the variable for re-
versal is statistically significant.  As predicted, whether a vote will entail 
reversing the lower court has a strong impact, significantly reducing 
the likelihood of a counter-ideological vote.  The control variables for 
judges’ gender, party affiliation, and ideological extremity are not sta-
tistically significant. 
Table 4:  Logistic Regression Model of Counter-Ideological Votes  
with Supreme Court as Reviewing Court 
Coefficient
Robust
Standard Error P>|z| 
Condition 1: 
Vote on Unified Panel (omitted base-
line variable) 
– – – 
Condition 2:
Majority Judge Vote when Minority 
Judge and Supreme Court
Nonaligned
1.216* 0.405 0.003 
124 Each observation in the data analyzed here consists of an individual judge vote 
in a case.  Because these votes were cast with judges sitting in panels of three, an as-
sumption that each observation is independent is not warranted.  In order to account 
for the possibility that some votes are correlated, I calculated robust standard errors 
clustered on each case. 
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Coefficient
Robust
Standard Error P>|z| 
Condition 4:
Majority Judge Vote when Minority 
Judge and Supreme Court
Aligned
0.700* 0.177 0.000 
Condition 3:
Minority Judge Vote when Minority 
Judge and Supreme Court
Nonaligned
0.822* 0.412 0.046 
Condition 5:
Minority Judge Vote when Minority 
Judge and Supreme Court
Aligned
1.171* 0.184 0.000 
Republican Male
(omitted baseline variable) 
– – – 
Republican Female 0.236 0.230 0.303 
Democratic Female -0.312 0.204 0.126 
Democratic Male -0.124 0.175 0.480 
Ideological Extremity -0.359 0.320 0.261 
Reversal Required -1.234* 0.164 0.000 
Constant -0.237 0.215 0.270 
Note:  Asterisk indicates significance at 95% level. 
Number of observations = 2361
Proportional reduction in error = 18.99% 
Log pseudolikelihood =  -1441.1935
Bayesian information criterion  =  2960.055 
Pseudo R2 = 0.0901 
The statistics reported for the various voting conditions are rela-
tively uninteresting in this form.  The fact that the coefficients for 
conditions 2 through 5 are all positive and statistically significant indi-
cates that judges sitting on mixed panels are more likely to vote coun-
ter-ideologically than judges on unified panels, merely confirming 
that panel effects occur. 
The important questions for testing the strategic account are 
whether a majority judge on a mixed panel votes differently depend-
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ing upon the alignment of preferences between the minority member 
and the Supreme Court (conditions 2 and 4) and whether a minority 
judge votes differently depending upon her alignment or lack thereof 
with the Supreme Court (conditions 3 and 5).  These questions can be 
answered by using the logistic regression to generate predictions 
about how a given judge will vote under a variety of hypothesized 
conditions. 
Figure 4:  Estimated Probability of Counter-Ideological Vote 
Note:  Estimated probabilities for Democratic male judge, using a 
logistic regression model of counter-ideological votes with the Su-
preme Court as reviewing court.  
Figure 4 graphically illustrates the predicted probability of a 
counter-ideological vote (along with the degree of uncertainty for each 
prediction) under each of the conditions of interest.  Because predicted 
probabilities can only be generated by specifying values for each of the 
variables in the model, Figure 4 reports the expected voting behavior of 
a Democratic male judge.  When probabilities are generated for other 
judge party and gender combinations, the same results obtain.125  Com-
125 See infra Appendix, Figure A-1. 
Democratic Male Judge
Majority Judge/Minority 
Supreme Court Aligned 
Majority Judge/Minority 
Supreme Court  
Nonaligned 
Minority Judge/Minority 
Supreme Court  
Nonaligned 
Minority Judge/Minority 
Supreme Court Aligned 
Estimated Probability 
Upper and Lower Bounds of Estimate
Differences between estimated probabilities in aligned and nonaligned conditions are not statistically significant 
.8.6.4.20
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paring the first two rows of Figure 4 reveals that the expected vote of a 
majority judge does not differ significantly depending on whether the 
minority judge’s preference is aligned with the Supreme Court’s or 
not.  Similarly, the last two rows show no statistically significant differ-
ence in the voting patterns of minority judges in the aligned and non-
aligned conditions.  Thus, although the strategic account predicts that 
appellate judges vote with an eye toward a possible response by the 
Supreme Court, I find no empirical evidence that panel effects, as 
measured by counter-ideological voting, are conditioned on the pref-
erences of the Supreme Court. 
B.  The Circuit En Banc as Reviewing Court 
Table 5 presents the results of the logistic regression when the cir-
cuit en banc is considered the reviewing court, rather than the Su-
preme Court.126  As in the first model, the variable capturing whether 
a reversal of the lower court would be required is highly significant.  
All other control variables—ideological extremity and gender and 
party variables—are not statistically significant.127  Similar to the first 
model, the dummy variables for the various voting conditions have 
positive coefficients and are generally statistically significant, indicat-
ing that voting on mixed panels is more likely to be counter-
ideological than on homogeneous panels, consistent with observed 
panel effects. 
Table 5:  Logistic Regression Model of Counter-Ideological Votes  
with Circuit En Banc as Reviewing Court 
Coefficient
Robust
Standard Error P>|z| 
Condition 1:
Vote for Unified Panel
(omitted baseline variable) 
– – – 
126 As explained supra note 124, I calculate and report robust standard errors clus-
tered by case because the three votes of the appellate panel sitting in a case are not 
independent.
127 The variables for Democratic female judge and ideological extremity are nega-
tively signed as expected (Democratic female judges are expected to be reluctant to 
vote against sex discrimination plaintiffs and more ideological judges are expected to 
be less likely to vote counter-ideologically), but neither is significant at the 95% level.  
None of the other demographic control variables come close to statistical significance. 
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Coefficient
Robust
Standard Error P>|z| 
Condition 2:
Majority Judge Vote when Minority 
Judge and Circuit Nonaligned 
0.332 0.269 0.217 
Condition 4: 
Majority Judge Vote when Minority 
Judge and Circuit Aligned 
0.821* 0.181 0.000 
Condition 3: 
Minority Judge Vote when Minority 
Judge and Circuit Nonaligned 
1.632* 0.282 0.000 
Condition 5: 
Minority Judge Vote when Minority 
Judge and Circuit Aligned 
1.107* 0.186 0.000 
Republican Male
(omitted baseline variable) 
– – – 
Republican Female 0.256 0.230 0.265 
Democratic Female -0.389 0.206 0.059 
Democratic Male -0.196 0.178 0.272 
Ideological Extremity -0.611 0.323 0.058 
Reversal Required -1.253* 0.165 0.000 
Constant -0.133 0.215 0.534 
Note:  Asterisk indicates significance at 95% level. 
Number of observations = 2361 
Proportional reduction in error = 19.53% 
Log pseudolikelihood = -1437.4986
Bayesian information criterion  =  2952.666 
Pseudo R2 = 0.0924
Once again, however, the real question of interest is whether 
judges vote differently depending upon the alignment of preferences 
between the minority member and the circuit as a whole.  I again use 
the logistic regression model to compare the estimated probabilities 
of a counter-ideological vote under different conditions.  In order to 
generate the predicted probabilities, I first consider the likely votes of 
a Democratic male judge.  Figure 5 compares the probability of a 
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counter-ideological vote by such a judge sitting in the majority when 
the minority and the full circuit are not aligned and aligned (condi-
tions 2 and 4), and the probability of a counter-ideological vote by the 
judge sitting in the minority, when his preferences and those of the 
full circuit are not aligned and aligned (conditions 3 and 5). 
Figure 5:  Estimated Probability of Counter-Ideological Vote 
Note:  Estimated probabilities for Democratic male judge, using a 
logistic regression model of counter-ideological votes with the cir-
cuit en banc as reviewing court. 
This analysis reveals appellate voting behavior quite different from 
that observed when the Supreme Court was treated as the reviewing 
court.  Consider the first two rows of Figure 5.  If the judge is a mem-
ber of the panel majority and the minority judge is not aligned with 
the circuit ideologically, he has a predicted probability of 45.1% of 
voting counter-ideologically.  However, when the minority panel 
member is more closely aligned with the circuit as a whole than with 
the panel majority, the probability of a counter-ideological vote by 
that same judge is predicted to increase to 57.2%.  This difference in 
Democratic Male Judge
Majority Judge/Minority 
Circuit Aligned 
Majority Judge/Minority 
Circuit Nonaligned* 
Minority Judge/Minority 
Circuit Aligned 
Minority Judge/Minority 
Circuit Nonaligned* 
*Difference between aligned and nonaligned conditions statistically significant at 95% level 
Estimated Probability 
Upper and Lower Bounds of Estimate 
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
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predicted probabilities is statistically significant at the 95% level.128
Consistent with the predictions of the strategic account, it offers evi-
dence that majority judges are more likely to bend to the views of the 
minority when the minority judge is more closely aligned with the cir-
cuit en banc. 
Examining the last two rows of Figure 5 reveals that the likelihood 
of the minority panel member voting counter-ideologically is also in-
fluenced by the preferences of the circuit en banc, but in the opposite 
direction.  If the judge’s views are not aligned with the circuit as a 
whole, he is predicted to vote counter-ideologically 75.1% of the time, 
whereas if his views are so aligned, his predicted probability of voting 
counter-ideologically decreases to 64.1%.  This difference is again statis-
tically significant at the 95% level.  And once again, the observed prob-
abilities are consistent with the strategic account.  When the minority 
judge’s preferences are aligned with those of the circuit as a whole, he is 
less likely to go along with the majority (and vote counter-ideologically) 
and more likely to stand his ground.  Perhaps he must dissent in order 
to do so, or perhaps he is able to convince one or both of the majority 
judges to join him.  In either case, he is more likely to vote as predicted 
under a naïve ideological model and less likely to vote counter-
ideologically than when he is not aligned with the circuit. 
For all combinations of gender and party of the judge, the prob-
ability of a counter-ideological vote changes under different voting 
conditions in the direction predicted by the strategic account, and in 
most cases the change is statistically significant.129  Considering all 
judge gender-party combinations together, the results strongly suggest 
128 Overlapping confidence intervals do not necessarily mean that the difference 
between estimated probabilities is not statistically significant.  See Lee Epstein, Andrew 
D. Martin & Matthew M. Schneider, On the Effective Communication of the Results of Em-
pirical Studies, Part I, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1811, 1815 n.12 (2006); see also Peter C. Austin & 
Janet E. Hux, Statistical Comment, A Brief Note on Overlapping Confidence Intervals, 36 J.
VASCULAR SURGERY 194, 194-95 (2002).  For each pair of conditions of interest, I calcu-
lated the difference between the expected probabilities and uncertainty surrounding 
that estimate to determine whether the difference between the two estimated quanti-
ties is statistically significant at the 95% level. 
129 See infra Appendix, Figure A-2.  Because the predicted probabilities can only be 
generated by specifying values for all of the variables, including the gender and party 
affiliation of the judge, the results presented are necessarily fine-grained.  However, 
one should be cautious about overinterpreting these results—for example, assuming 
that Republican male judges are less strategic than Democratic male judges because 
the difference in predicted probabilities for conditions 2 and 4 for a Republican male 
judge is not statistically significant at the 95% level.  If a slightly more relaxed test is 
used, the difference in counter-ideological voting for a Republican male judge be-
tween conditions 2 and 4 would be considered statistically significant. 
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that counter-ideological votes—what we observe as panel effects—are 
conditional on the preferences of the circuit court as a whole. 
The results of the logistic regression can also be used to estimate 
changes in the probabilities of a counter-ideological vote by a judge 
under different voting circumstances, while holding constant the 
alignment between the minority judge and the full circuit.  In the first 
panel of Figure 6, the preferences of the minority judge and the cir-
cuit are not aligned.  The point estimates illustrate how the behavior 
of a judge changes depending on whether the judge is in the majority 
or in the minority, using his vote on a unified panel for a baseline 
comparison.130  Although Figure 6 depicts graphically the results for a 
Democratic male judge, the same substantive results obtain for all 
other judge gender and party combinations. 
Figure 6:  Estimated Probability of Counter-Ideological Vote in  
Different Voting Circumstances 
130 Figure 6 graphs the expected probabilities for Democratic male judges.  The 
basic substantive results for other gender-party combinations are identical to those in 
Figure 6. 
Homogenous Panel 
Panel 1:  Minority Judge and Circuit Nonaligned 
Majority Judge 
Minority Judge 
Values graphed for Democratic male judge only
Difference between majority and minority judge is significant at 95% level 
Expected Probability of Nonideological Vote 
Upper and Lower Bounds of Estimate 
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
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As the Figure illustrates, there is no statistically significant differ-
ence in the level of counter-ideological voting between a judge sitting 
on a homogeneous panel and the same judge sitting in the majority 
on a mixed panel when the minority judge is not aligned with the cir-
cuit.  There is, however, a difference—both statistically and substan-
tively significant—between the voting patterns of a judge sitting as 
part of the majority and a judge sitting as the minority when the mi-
nority judge is not aligned with the circuit.  In other words, under the 
nonalignment condition, the tendency to vote counter-ideologically 
turns on whether a judge is in the majority or the minority, a simple 
consequence of dissent suppression.  The presence of one panelist 
appointed by a President of the opposing party does not appear to sig-
nificantly affect the likelihood that the majority judge will vote counter-
ideologically compared with his votes on a homogeneous panel. 
As the second panel of Figure 6 illustrates, the situation is the op-
posite when the minority judge is aligned with the circuit as a whole.  
Under that condition, the probability of a counter-ideological vote in-
creases significantly, both statistically and substantively, when a judge 
is seated with just one opposing-party appointee compared with his 
vote on a homogeneous panel.  The likelihood of a counter-
ideological vote does not differ significantly, however, between a ma-
jority judge and minority judge when the minority judge is aligned with 
the circuit.  Together, the two panels of Figure 6 suggest that observed 
panel effects involve two separate effects.  The moderation of a majority 
Panel 2:  Minority Judge and Circuit Aligned
Homogenous Panel 
Majority Judge 
Values graphed for Democratic male judge only
Difference between homogenous panel and majority judge is significant at 95% level 
Minority Judge 
Estimated Probability of Nonideological Vote 
Upper and Lower Bounds of Estimate 
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
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judge’s vote in the presence of one opposing-party appointee compared 
with his vote on a unified panel appears to be driven by the alignment 
between the preferences of the minority judge and the circuit, while the 
difference between the voting patterns of majority and minority panel-
ists appears to be the result of simple dissent suppression. 
IV. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
A.  The Role of the Supreme Court and the Circuit En Banc 
The empirical test described here offers no evidence that panel 
effects are sensitive to the preferences of the Supreme Court.  Specifi-
cally, I find no support for the theory that minority judges are more 
likely to vote in an ideological direction in situations in which they 
could expect that their dissent would serve as a signal encouraging the 
Supreme Court to review a case.  Nor do I find evidence that majority 
judges respond to such a situation by acceding more readily to the ar-
guments of the minority and voting counter-ideologically.  These find-
ings contradict Cross and Tiller’s whistleblowing theory to the extent 
that it posits that the presence of a minority judge who will “blow the 
whistle” induces the panel majority to obey Supreme Court doc-
trine.131  More generally, the results call into question the theory that 
strategic behavior vis-à-vis the Supreme Court explains panel effects. 
In addition, this study raises questions for traditional principal-
agent models of the judicial hierarchy.132  These models typically as-
sume that the Supreme Court’s reversal power is crucial for ensuring 
lower court compliance with doctrine.  In order to explain how the 
Supreme Court can exercise effective control given that it currently 
reviews less than 1% of court of appeals decisions, theorists have sug-
gested that various mechanisms, such as signaling mechanisms, en-
hance the Court’s control.133  The results of this study undermine the 
plausibility of at least one of those theorized mechanisms—that the 
risk of dissent by a minority panel member will induce compliance by 
appellate judges without the necessity of actual Supreme Court review.  
131 Cross & Tiller, supra note 10, at 2159. 
132 See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text. 
133 See, e.g., Cross & Tiller, supra note 10, at 2159 (theorizing that the possibility 
that a minority member of a panel may dissent will induce judges to comply with doc-
trine); Songer, Segal & Cameron, supra note 22, at 675 (hypothesizing that losing liti-
gants are more likely to appeal when precedent is not followed, thereby signaling the 
need for Supreme Court review). 
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While dissent may serve as a useful signal to the Supreme Court when 
deciding which cases to hear, the increased possibility of review in the 
presence of a potential dissenter does not appear to influence the 
panel voting behavior of court of appeals judges. 
On the other hand, these results should not be misunderstood to 
suggest that court of appeals judges do not follow Supreme Court doc-
trine.  Numerous studies have found that the decisions of the Su-
preme Court have an impact on lower court decision making,134 and 
the results here are not inconsistent with those findings.  Circuit 
judges do not vote according to a naïve ideological model, and the 
large degree of overlap in voting behavior between judges affiliated 
with opposite parties indicates that factors other than ideology—in all 
likelihood legal doctrine—influence their decisions.  However, even 
though the preferences of the Supreme Court Justices shape appellate 
decision making through the precedent that they establish, those 
preferences do not appear to influence panel effects.  The observed 
tendency of appellate judges to be influenced by their panel col-
leagues does not depend on the risk that a dissent will provoke review 
and reversal. 
In contrast to the results of the Supreme Court model, this study 
provides strong evidence that the preferences of the full circuit influ-
ence panel effects.135  Bargaining and compromise on the part of ma-
jority judges is more likely to occur when the panel minority is aligned 
with the circuit as a whole.  Moreover, a minority judge is more likely 
to stand her ground and refuse to go along with the majority’s prefer-
ences when she is more closely aligned with the circuit than with the 
majority.  These results are precisely those that are predicted by a stra-
tegic account of panel decision making.  Strategic judges are hypothe-
sized to anticipate the actions of the circuit en banc.  When the mi-
nority is aligned with the circuit, the minority judge perceives that she 
would be better off, and the majority judges perceive that they would 
be worse off, if the circuit were to hear the case en banc, and there-
fore the panel judges adjust their voting behavior accordingly. 
Comparing the results of the two models raises the question why 
panel effects appear to be influenced by the circuit’s preferences, but 
not by the Supreme Court’s.  Rehearing en banc and Supreme Court 
134 See supra note 90. 
135 Similarly, Cross found that case outcomes appear to be influenced by current 
circuit court preferences, even though current Supreme Court preferences did not 
have such an effect. See CROSS, supra note 12, at 122. 
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review are both extremely unlikely events.  The chance of either oc-
currence in any given court of appeals case is less than 1%.  Thus, the 
simple statistical risk of reversal cannot explain the difference in  
influence.136  A more likely explanation is that the relationship of the 
circuit judge to the circuit as a whole is quite different from her rela-
tionship to the Supreme Court.  The individual appellate judge inter-
acts with other judges on the same circuit on a regular basis—on 
other panel sittings, in the context of administrative functions, and 
even casually in the halls of the courthouse.137  By contrast, she is far 
less likely to interact directly with Supreme Court Justices, and may 
perceive them only as a remote presence whose primary communica-
tions are the written opinions that they issue.  Because of the routine, 
ongoing interactions among judges within a circuit, the views of their 
immediate colleagues will be far more salient for panel members 
when they deliberate than the preferences of the Supreme Court.138
The possibility of an en banc rehearing is also likely to be more sa-
lient than the risk of Supreme Court review because the costs of the 
former will be felt immediately by the appellate judge.  When a case is 
reheard en banc, the three judges who constituted the original panel 
must rehear the case with their other circuit colleagues, consuming 
more of their time and effort.  Rehearing en banc is also costly for the 
circuit as a whole.  Ginsburg and Falk estimate that a case reheard en 
banc by the D.C. Circuit “consumes as much of the court’s resources 
as five or six cases heard by a panel” because every judge on the circuit 
needs to spend time reading the briefs, familiarizing themselves with 
the facts and relevant law, rehearing oral argument, and deliberating 
about the outcome.139
On a larger court, where an en banc rehearing will involve more 
judges, the costs will be even higher.  Importantly, these costs are very 
136 Of course, the statistical risk of review cannot be taken as a direct measure of 
the level of control exercised by the reviewing court.  See supra note 71.  Arguably, 
however, the capacities of the Supreme Court and the circuits en banc to review sig-
nificantly more panel decisions are similarly constrained. 
137 All of the judges in a circuit do not necessarily have their chambers in the same 
building; nevertheless, because of rotating panel assignments, they will at times be in 
the same place physically, even if they are not sitting together during a particular court 
session.
138 This explanation is consistent with the findings of Giles et al. that “while . . . 
ideological heterogeneity plays an important part in determining the frequency of en 
banc rehearings in a circuit, . . . its effects are tempered by a consciousness of the pref-
erences and likely behaviors of the other members of the circuit.”  Giles, Walker & 
Zorn, supra note 71, at 461. 
139 Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 4, at 1020. 
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visible to appellate judges, for they will be borne by the panel mem-
bers themselves, as well as their close colleagues, and these costs are 
incurred whether the panel decision is ultimately reversed or af-
firmed.  By contrast, review by the Supreme Court is only costly if the 
panel decision is reversed; an affirmation by the Supreme Court is 
more likely viewed as a benefit.  And while a reversal by the Supreme 
Court may impose a policy or reputational loss on the panelists, it will 
likely require them to do little more than reverse or vacate their prior 
decision and remand to the district court for further proceedings. 
The fact that circuit preferences, but not Supreme Court prefer-
ences, appear to influence panel interactions suggests that circuit 
judges feel particularly responsible to the circuit of which they are a 
part.  Scholars have argued that appellate judges are “representatives
of the circuit,”140 and that panel decisions are expected to emulate the 
results that would be reached by the full circuit.141  Similarly, Ginsburg 
and Falk argue that appellate courts “function[] best when each 
member feels responsible to each of the others, and responsible for 
the performance of the whole.”142  Such a situation “works to increase 
collegiality on the court.”143  Thus, to the extent that appellate judges 
conceive of their role as that of agents acting on behalf of the full cir-
cuit, their ability to influence one another during panel deliberations 
is likely to depend upon how the panel members perceive the prefer-
ences of the circuit as a whole. 
B.  Internal Panel Dynamics 
Although the results of this study are entirely consistent with a 
strategic account of panel effects—at least vis-à-vis the circuit en 
banc—they do not conclusively establish that strategic behavior ex-
plains panel effects.  More specifically, they do not establish the pre-
cise mechanism by which circuit preferences influence panel effects.  
Certainly, dissent-suppression theories remain relevant to explain why 
minority judges are more likely to vote counter-ideologically than ma-
jority judges in general, but the results here are consistent with some 
alternative explanations of panel effects as well. 
140 Solimine, supra note 4, at 49. 
141 See Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 5, at 89 (finding evidence that Justices’ 
votes are influenced by the quality of oral argument). 
142 Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 4, at 1013. 
143 Id.
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Strategic theories suggest that any observed changes in voting pat-
terns reflect judges’ calculations about how the full circuit might re-
spond to the panel decision.  Thus, while deliberating about a case, a 
judge might say to her panel colleagues, “If you insist on resolving the 
case that way, I am going to dissent.  You know that my dissent will 
make it more likely that the circuit will hear this case en banc, and if it 
does, it will likely decide in a manner that I prefer (and you do not).”  
This sort of reasoning may not be voiced explicitly, but strategic theo-
ries argue that it lies behind the decision making of the panel members. 
It is also possible, however, that judges neither speak nor even 
reason internally in such an explicitly strategic manner.  They may in-
stead be influenced by the views of their panel colleagues in other 
ways that are better explained in psychological or social terms.  For 
example, the process of panel deliberation may actually alter judges’ 
perceptions and sincere views of a case.  By studying only votes, there 
is no way of knowing whether a shift in voting behavior represents a 
strategic calculation or a genuine change in belief.  Nevertheless, 
judges have reported that deliberation with colleagues may change 
their views,144 and several empirical studies suggest that judges’ prefer-
ences sometimes shift, either in response to the parties’ arguments or 
over time.145
One possible theory, proposed by Sunstein et al., is that well-
established psychological phenomena like conformity effects and 
group polarization explain how internal panel deliberations shift 
judges’ preferences.146  These psychological theories are difficult to 
verify empirically because they emphasize processes that are internal 
to individual judges and cannot be observed directly.147  Of even 
144 See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 3, at 1660 (explaining that the give and take of 
collegial deliberation may shift a judge’s initial view of a case). 
145 See, e.g., Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn & Jeffrey A. Segal, 
Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court Justices:  Who, When, and How Important?, 101 NW. U.
L. REV. 1483, 1504 (2007) (documenting “ideological drift” by a majority of Justices 
who have served on the Supreme Court for ten or more terms since 1937); Timothy R. 
Johnson, Paul J. Wahlbeck & James F. Spriggs, II, The Influence of Oral Arguments on the 
U.S. Supreme Court, 100 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 99, 103-04 (2006) (finding evidence that the 
Justices’ votes are influenced by the quality of oral argument); Theodore W. Ruger, 
Justice Harry Blackmun and the Phenomenon of Judicial Preference Change, 70 MO. L. REV.
1209 (2005) (arguing that preferences and voting behaviors of Justices may evolve sig-
nificantly over the course of their careers). 
146 SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?, supra note 10, at 67-76. 
147 For example, the theory that judges “go to extremes” after deliberating with 
like-minded colleagues cannot be tested without some way of measuring individual 
judges’ preferences prior to their deliberation on a unified panel.  Id. at 72.  Sunstein 
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greater concern, these theories extend conclusions drawn from behav-
ior in experimental settings to the quite different circumstances un-
der which judges decide cases, raising serious doubts about their gen-
erality.148  In particular, certain aspects of judicial decision making—
notably interpreting and applying the law—are quite different in na-
ture from tasks such as making judgments about facts that have been 
the focus of experimental-psychology research.  As Schauer argues, it 
is “a mistake to draw conclusions about how judges perform a range of 
judge-specific tasks from what we have found about how lay people 
perform quite different tasks.”149  Even if such conclusions can be ap-
propriately extrapolated to judges, psychological phenomena like con-
formity effects and group polarization would operate in the same way 
and his colleagues take as evidence of group polarization the fact that judges’ votes on 
unified panels differ from those on mixed panels.  For example, a Democratic ap-
pointee sitting with two other Democratic appointees will vote liberally a significantly 
greater percentage of the time than when sitting with one Democratic appointee and 
one Republican appointee.  But without knowing the baseline preferences of judges 
prior to deliberation (or even better, prior to the assignment of panels), it is impossible 
to know what effect interaction with colleagues has on a judge’s views.  It might be the 
case that a judge’s vote on a unified panel reflects her “true” preferences and that sit-
ting with judges of the other party leads to moderation of those views.  In other words, 
compromising, rather than going to extremes, may explain the observed difference in 
voting patterns on unified and mixed panels.  Without a baseline measure of judges’ 
“true” preferences, these two accounts simply cannot be disentangled. 
148 The “group polarization” phenomenon, for example, has been documented in 
groups of “like-minded” subjects and is hypothesized to occur because groups of like-
minded people have access to a limited pool of arguments, individuals wish to be 
viewed favorably by other group members, and corroboration strengthens individual 
views.  Id. at 73-76.  Appellate judges, however, typically decide cases in very small 
groups of three, with colleagues who share their professional training and institutional 
interests, and are subject to a set of institutional and cultural norms regarding appro-
priate methods for making decisions.  The argument pool available to them includes 
not only the views of the three panel members, but also those presented by the litigants 
in briefs and oral arguments and the opinions of other judges in similar cases.  In addi-
tion, judges express their views in a particularly public way, and, thus, to the extent 
that they wish to be viewed favorably, that concern likely extends not just to their two 
copanelists, but also to the litigants in the case, their lawyers, other lawyers and judges, 
and potentially a broader public.  These differences from experimental conditions 
raise questions as to whether, and to what extent, decision making by judges will re-
semble that observed in the experimental setting.  Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Wistrich 
have collected experimental evidence suggesting that while judges are subject to the 
same cognitive biases as everyone else, they are able to overcome those biases in cer-
tain contexts.  See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on 
the Bench:  How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 27-29 (2007). 
149 Frederick Schauer, Is There a Psychology of Judging?, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JU-
DICIAL DECISION MAKING (David E. Klein & Gregory Mitchell eds., forthcoming 2009) 
(manuscript at 4), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1015143. 
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regardless of the preferences of the full circuit, and thus they offer no 
explanation for the empirical findings here. 
Alternative psychological theories may offer a better account of 
why panel effects are observed and how they are influenced by circuit 
preferences.  Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey Rachlinksi, and Andrew Wistrich 
propose an “intuitive-override” model of judging based on findings 
that people engage in two modes of decision making:  intuitive and 
deliberative.150  Intuitive processes are automatic, quick, and not cog-
nitively demanding.151  By contrast, deliberative processes are slower 
and require effort and concentration.152  Although intuitive judgments 
are often accurate, the heuristics and mental shortcuts that underlie 
them can have a biasing effect, leading to systematic error.  Guthrie et 
al. offer experimental evidence that district court judges are in fact 
prone to intuitive decision making, but are also capable of delibera-
tive decision making under certain conditions.153  A similar mecha-
nism might underlie decision making by appellate court judges.  More 
specifically, court of appeals judges might initially rely on intuitive 
judgments—quick decisions that tend to align with their policy pref-
erences—but those judgments may yield if subjected to more delib-
erative processes.  The presence of a judge with a different ideological 
orientation might induce such a deliberative process on the part of 
the majority judges, whereas the judges’ initial (intuitive) judgments 
may go unexamined on a unified panel.154
This intuitive-override model suggests an alternative account that 
explains why judges on mixed panels decide cases less ideologically 
than do judges on unified panels, but why would these effects depend 
upon circuit preferences?  The answer likely lies in the nature of the 
deliberative process.  If a minority judge induces the majority to reex-
150 Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 148, at 6-9. 
151 Id. at 7 and sources cited therein. 
152 Id. at 7, 8 & tbl.1. 
153 Id. at 27-29. 
154 Although Cross and Tiller primarily describe their whistleblower theory in stra-
tegic terms, they acknowledge another possibility—that appellate judges do not delib-
erately disregard the law, but that “cognitive shortcuts” may lead to “apparently politi-
cal results.”  If this is the case, “the minority judge can serve as a whistleblower by 
revealing these biasing cognitive shortcuts.”  Cross & Tiller, supra note 10, at 2174.  
Sunstein et al. similarly characterize any whistleblower effect in psychological rather 
than strategic terms.  See, e.g., SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?, supra note 10, 
at 79 (“[T]he whistleblower can draw her colleagues’ attention to legally relevant ar-
guments that, while not necessarily decisive, deserve careful consideration and some-
times make a difference to the outcome.”). 
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amine its initial conclusion, she probably does so by discussing prece-
dent and making legal arguments.  And it may be the case that a mi-
nority judge will be most successful in convincing the panel majority 
to change its views when her own views are more closely aligned with 
the circuit’s than with the majority’s.  Because the views of the circuit 
are likely embodied in the law of the circuit, the minority judge will 
have more powerful legal arguments when she is aligned with the full 
circuit.  In other words, minority judges will be most persuasive—and 
panel effects most apparent—when circuit law is on their side. 
Without more evidence, it is difficult to disentangle which of these 
mechanisms actually explains why panel effects occur.  This study 
cannot resolve that question; however, it strongly suggests that, what-
ever the mechanism, panel effects are sensitive to the circuit environ-
ment.  In short, when appellate judges deliberate on panels of three, 
they do not do so in a vacuum, but are influenced by the circuit of 
which they are a part. 
CONCLUSION
Scholars have increasingly come to recognize that judges do not 
simple-mindedly pursue their preferences.  Rather, they are strategic 
actors influenced not only by their policy goals, but also by the institu-
tional context in which they operate.  One of the most important in-
sights regarding decision making by federal court of appeals judges is 
the recognition that panel composition matters.  Appellate judges are 
influenced not only by their own preferences, but also by those of 
their colleagues with whom they hear cases.  Identifying panel effects 
as a critical component of appellate decision making has raised fur-
ther questions about when and why these effects occur. 
Understanding why panel effects occur is crucial to answering 
questions about policy and institutional design.  If panel effects tend 
to moderate the influence of ideology, should they be encouraged?  
And if so, what institutional changes might increase this moderating 
effect?  Based on their whistleblower theory, Frank Cross and Emer-
son Tiller propose a rule that every appellate panel be composed of at 
least one judge from each political party so that the judge in the ideo-
logical minority can draw the attention of the Supreme Court to any 
“disobedience” of the law.155  But is such a rule wise policy if their the-
155 Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, Colloquy, A Modest Proposal for Improving 
American Justice, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 228-29 (1999). 
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ory of panel effects is wrong?  Others have argued for reforms such as 
increasing the number of appellate judgeships or splitting the Ninth 
Circuit.  Judging the wisdom of these changes, however, requires an 
understanding of how appellate judges interact—both within the 
three-judge panel and across the circuit as a whole. 
This Article offers a first step toward better understanding panel 
effects.  The analysis conducted here does not support the theory that 
panel effects are caused by strategic behavior aimed at inducing or 
avoiding Supreme Court review.  On the other hand, the findings 
strongly suggest that panel effects are influenced by circuit prefer-
ences.  Both minority and majority judges on ideologically mixed pan-
els differ in their willingness to vote counter-ideologically, depending 
upon how the circuit as a whole is aligned relative to the panel mem-
bers.  These results are consistent with the theory that circuit judges 
behave strategically with an eye to circuit en banc review.  It is also 
possible, however, that court of appeals judges are responding to their 
circuit environment more generally, or to circuit doctrine more specifi-
cally, rather than acting directly out of fear of an en banc reversal. 
A great deal more empirical work remains to be done to under-
stand panel effects fully.  The data examined here include only Title 
VII sex discrimination cases, even though panel effects have been 
documented in a broad variety of issue areas.  Empirical analysis of the 
causes of panel effects should be extended to other areas of law to de-
termine whether similar patterns are observed, as well as to unpub-
lished opinions in which the causes of panel effects may differ.  In ad-
dition, more work needs to be done to disentangle the different 
motivational accounts of panel effects.  Looking beyond votes and ex-
amining the impact of panel composition on reasoning as well will 
further enhance understanding of how interactions among colleagues 
affect judicial decision making.  In the end, it is likely that panel ef-
fects, like judicial decision making more generally, can only be under-
stood by taking account of a variety of factors—strategic, ideological, 
psychological, and legal. 
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 APPENDIX
Table A-1:  Logistic Regression Model of Counter-Ideological Votes 
with Supreme Court as Reviewing Court,  
Including Circuit Fixed Effects 
Coefficient
Robust
Standard Error P > |z| 
Condition 2:
Majority Judge Vote when Minority 
Judge and Supreme Court
Nonaligned
1.149* 0.402 0.004 
Condition 4:
Majority Judge Vote when
Minority Judge and Supreme Court 
Aligned
0.751* 0.175 0.000 
Condition 3: 
Minority Judge Vote when
Minority Judge and Supreme Court 
Nonaligned
0.707 0.439 0.107 
Condition 5:
Minority Judge Vote when
Minority Judge and Supreme Court 
Aligned
1.218* 0.185 0.000 
Republican Female 0.215 0.225 0.340 
Democratic Female -0.300 0.212 0.156 
Democratic Male -0.072 0.179 0.687 
Ideological Extremity -0.316 0.332 0.341 
Reversal Required -1.263* 0.165 0.000 
2d Circuit 
3d Circuit 
4th Circuit 
5th Circuit 
6th Circuit 
-0.543
-0.248
-0.116
0.689
-0.315
0.287
0.251
0.264
0.374
0.287
0.058
0.323
0.661
0.065
0.273
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Coefficient
Robust
Standard Error P > |z| 
7th Circuit 
8th Circuit 
9th Circuit 
10th Circuit 
11th Circuit 
D.C. Circuit 
-0.225
0.012
-0.022
-0.195
-0.517
-0.170
0.270
0.321
0.250
0.253
0.281
0.336
0.406
0.970
0.929
0.442
0.066
0.612
Constant -0.131 0.307 0.669 
Note:  Asterisk indicates significance at 95% level.
Number of observations = 2361
Proportional reduction in error = 20.1% 
Log pseudolikelihood = -1426.6807
Bayesian information criterion = 3016.465
Pseudo R2 = 0.0992 
Figure A-1:  Estimated Probability of  
Counter-Ideological Vote 
Democratic Female Judge
Majority Judge/Minority 
Supreme Court Aligned 
Majority Judge/Minority 
Supreme Court Nonaligned 
Minority Judge/Minority 
Supreme Court Aligned
Minority Judge/Minority 
Supreme Court Nonaligned 
Differences between estimated probabilities in aligned and nonaligned conditions are not statistically significant 
Estimated Probability 
Upper and Lower Bounds of Estimate 
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
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Note:  Estimated probabilities for Democratic female, Republican 
male, and Republican female judges, using a logistic regression 
model of counter-ideological votes with the Supreme Court as re-
viewing court. 
Republican Male Judge
Majority Judge/Minority 
Supreme Court Aligned 
Majority Judge/Minority 
Supreme Court Nonaligned 
Minority Judge/Minority 
Supreme Court Aligned 
Differences between estimated probabilities in aligned and nonaligned conditions are not statistically significant 
Minority Judge/Minority 
Supreme Court Nonaligned 
Estimated Probability 
Upper and Lower Bounds of Estimate 
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Majority Judge/Minority 
Supreme Court Aligned 
Majority Judge/Minority 
Supreme Court Nonaligned 
Minority Judge/Minority 
Supreme Court Aligned 
Minority Judge/Minority 
Supreme Court Nonaligned 
Differences between estimated probabilities in aligned and nonaligned conditions are not statistically significant 
Estimated Probability 
Upper and Lower Bounds of Estimate 
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Republican Female Judge
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Table A-2:  Logistic Regression Model of Counter-Ideological Votes 
with Circuit En Banc as Reviewing Court,  
Including Circuit Fixed Effects 
Coefficient
Robust
Standard Error P > |z| 
Condition 2: 
Majority Judge Vote when Minority 
Judge and Circuit Nonaligned 
0.344 0.269 0.202 
Condition 4:
Majority Judge Vote when Minority 
Judge and Circuit Aligned 
0.875* 0.180 0.000 
Condition 3: 
Minority Judge Vote when Minority 
Judge and Circuit Nonaligned 
1.621* 0.287 0.000 
Condition 5:
Minority Judge Vote when Minority 
Judge and Circuit Aligned 
1.157* 0.187 0.000 
Republican Female 0.236 0.227 0.299 
Democratic Female -0.376 0.213 0.077 
Democratic Male -0.145 0.182 0.425 
Ideological Extremity -0.574 0.336 0.087 
Reversal Required -1.285* 0.166 0.000 
2d Circuit 
3d Circuit 
4th Circuit 
5th Circuit 
6th Circuit 
7th Circuit 
8th Circuit 
9th Circuit 
10th Circuit 
-0.572*
-0.288
-0.127
0.647
-0.330
-0.244
0.005
-0.029
-0.236
0.285
0.249
0.263
0.373
0.286
0.267
0.320
0.248
0.251
0.045
0.249
0.629
0.083
0.250
0.362
0.987
0.906
0.348
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Coefficient
Robust
Standard Error P > |z| 
11th Circuit 
D.C. Circuit 
-0.544
-0.155
0.278
0.334
0.051
0.644
Constant -0.006 0.306 0.985 
Note:  Asterisk indicates significance at 95% level. 
Number of observations = 2361
Proportional reduction in error = 21.3% 
Log pseudolikelihood = -1422.6359
Bayesian information criterion = 3008.376 
Pseudo R2 = 0.1018
 Figure A-2:  Estimated Probability of  
Counter-Ideological Vote 
Democratic Female Judge
Majority Judge/Minority 
Circuit Aligned 
Majority Judge/Minority 
Circuit Nonaligned* 
Minority Judge/Minority 
Circuit Nonaligned* 
Minority Judge/Minority 
Circuit Aligned 
*Difference between aligned and nonaligned conditions statistically significant at 95% level 
Estimated Probability 
Upper and Lower Bounds of Estimate 
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
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Note:  Estimated probabilities for Democratic female, Republican 
male, and Republican female judges, using a logistic regression 
model of counter-ideological votes with the circuit en banc as re-
viewing court. 
Republican Male Judge 
Majority Judge/Minority 
Circuit Nonaligned 
Majority Judge/Minority 
Circuit Aligned 
Minority Judge/Minority 
Circuit Aligned 
Minority Judge/Minority 
Circuit Nonaligned* 
*Difference between aligned and nonaligned conditions statistically significant at 95% level 
Estimated Probability 
Upper and Lower Bounds of Estimate 
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Republican Female Judge 
Majority Judge/Minority 
Circuit Aligned 
Majority Judge/Minority 
Circuit Nonaligned 
Minority Judge/Minority 
Circuit Aligned 
Minority Judge/Minority 
Circuit Nonaligned* 
*Difference between aligned and nonaligned conditions statistically significant at 95% level 
Estimated Probability 
Upper and Lower Bounds of Estimate 
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
